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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Judicial review of arbitral awards is afforded a great deal of importance and scrutiny in 
international commercial arbitration proceedings. It is much debated as to whether judicial 
review of arbitral awards is appropriate, given that international arbitration is considered to be a 
mechanism that secures the final and binding determination of disputes.1 On one hand, scholars 
opine that judicial review undermines the finality of arbitral awards and interferes with the 
integrity of the arbitral process2, while others believe that, “much as the efficacy of international 
commercial arbitration demands finality of awards, it is incumbent on national legal systems to 
ensure the integrity of the arbitral process”.3 
The opponents of judicial review also endorse the strong argument that relying on 
national courts to correct possible errors in arbitration defeats the advantages of selecting 
“neutral and potentially expert tribunals” and avoiding the possible “congestion, corruption and 
                                                 
1 See JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003) at 1-5 for definitions of international arbitration : “A 
specially defined mechanism for the final and binding determination of disputes, concerning a contractual or other 
relationship with an international element, by independent arbitrators, in accordance with procedures, structures and 
substantive legal or non-legal standards chosen directly or indirectly by the parties”, id quoting  Halsbury’s Laws of 
England: “The process by which a dispute or difference between two or more parties as to their mutual legal rights 
and liabilities is referred to and determined judicially and with binding effect by the application of law by one or 
more persons(the arbitral tribunal) instead of by a court of law”,  id at 3 quoting Domke: “Commercial Arbitration” 
“[A] process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by 
them for a decision based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitral tribunal. The parties 
agree in advance that the arbitrator’s determination, the award, will be accepted as final and binding upon them.”  
2 For e.g., Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 147 (1997); Kenneth Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 337, 339 (2000).
3 Chukwuemeke Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Bane, Boon or Boondoggle? 10 N.Y. INT'L 
L. REV. 29 (1997); see for e.g., William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural 
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procedural pitfalls of national courts”.4 Given the contrasting opinions and potential problems 
surrounding judicial review, it is advocated that if parties need to seek review of arbitral awards, 
appellate arbitral review may be a suitable alternative to judicial review.   
The concept of appellate arbitral review is not entirely new, given that a few existing 
arbitration rules offer “built-in avenues of review”.5 However, a unified system of arbitral appeal 
that offers predictability and universality is yet to be established. Eminent scholars and legal 
experts have continuously been expressing a desire for the creation of a single transnational 
institution for the enforcement and review of arbitral awards.6
The central focus of this thesis is how the establishment of a transnational appellate 
arbitral review body (hereinafter AARB, the AARB) will serve as a suitable replacement for 
judicial review and be a viable source of appeal in general. The thesis also encompasses an 
elaborate set of suggestions based on which the AARB may be structured.
                                                                                                                                                             
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647 (1989); infra Chapter III for a more elaborate discussion 
of this argument. 
4 William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting The Farm On International Arbitration: Is It Time To Offer An 
Appeal Option? 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 531 (2000). 
5 Id at 534. 
6 Howard M. Holtzmann , A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes 
on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds., 
1995) at 109: “A valuable task for the 21st century would be to create a new international court that would take the 
place of municipal courts in resolving disputes concerning the enforceability of international commercial arbitration 
awards”; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards in THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION at 115-116: “Accordingly, as things now 
stand, there is no international court with an effective capacity or jurisdiction whose processes can be directly 
activated by a private party which seeks the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The need is 
there, and no existing international court can meet it. So the case for creating such a new International Court of 
Arbitral Awards is,...sound”; see also F.S. Nariman,, Martin Hunter and Bola A. Ajibola and Hans Van Houtte 
endorsing the propositions of Holtzmann and Schwebel at 155-163  in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION; see also MAURO-RUBINO SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRTAION LAW AND PRACTICE, 2 (2001) at 35.9: “The solution which has been proposed by this writer is 
to institutionalize the appellate instance by entrusting the appointment and supervision of appellate proceedings to a 
new body, an International Arbitral Court of Appeal”; Knull & Rubins, supra note 4; Conrad K. Harper, Has the 
Time Come for a Truly Neutral Forum? Reconsidering a Court of International Arbitration in HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADR (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi, eds., 2006) Hans 
Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution, 25 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 29 (1986). 
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Chapter 2 of this thesis will examine how different national laws view the concept of 
judicial review of international arbitral awards. Chapter 3 will address the various arguments 
against judicial review and how the AARB will be a suitable replacement for the same. Chapter 
4 will talk about the available appeal options within the realm of arbitration and the need for a 
unified system through which appellate review of awards may be conducted. Chapter 5 will list 
various recommendations for the AARB and Chapter 6 will draw a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS - A TRANSNATIONAL SURVEY 
 
 
“The whole point of arbitration is that the merits of the dispute will not be 
reviewed in courts, wherever they be located”.7
 
 
Judicial review of an international arbitral award is conducted by the national courts at 
the place of arbitration or enforcement.8 The most important interaction of the arbitral procedure 
with the judicial procedure is the judicial review of awards.9 Judicial review of arbitral awards 
can happen in two different ways. Either the losing party seeks to attack the award or the 
winning party seeks to confirm the award.10 Generally, if an award is successfully annulled, 
recognition of that award will be refused in any other country on the basis of that annulment.11 
On the other hand, the effects of confirmation or refusal of confirmation of an award are limited 
to the jurisdiction where such confirmation is sought.12
The standard of judicial review for setting aside or annulling an award varies with each 
country. While some countries allow for judicial review on the entire merits of the case13, most 
countries limit the grounds of judicial review, most of which correspond to the exceptions to 
                                                 
7 Justice Conboy’s comment in International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 
F.Supp. 172 S.D.N.Y.,1990.
8 See CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, LARS KIRCHHOFF & GABRIEL SCHERER, ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 2 (2006) at 54,55. 
9 Id at 52.  
10 Wang Shengchang & Cao Lijun, National Courts and Lex Fori in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) at 177  
11 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 54. 
12 Id. 
13 Id at 55. 
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recognition and enforcement contained in the New York Convention.14 Since the trends in 
judicial review of international arbitral awards can best be observed from the practices of the 
United States and the major European arbitration countries,15 we will examine the laws of those 
countries hereunder. 
 
A. Judicial Review under Different National Laws 
 
The Federal Arbitration Act of the United States16 was amended in 1970 to implement the 
New York Convention.17 The Act provides for arbitration awards to be enforced pursuant to the 
New York Convention and stipulates that confirmation proceedings may be initiated where the 
prevailing party seeks to enforce the award in the United States, but not when the party seeks to 
enforce the award abroad.18 The Act provides limited grounds for challenging an award, as per 
the Article V of the Convention and United States courts interpret Article V defenses narrowly.19 
                                                 
14 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 544; Article V of the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (hereinafter the New York 
Convention) states that :
(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused [if]: a) The parties to the [arbitration] agreement … 
were … under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid …; or b) The party against whom the award is 
invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case; or c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by [the arbitration 
agreement]; or d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended 
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. (2) Recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if …: a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would 
be contrary to the public policy of that country.  
15 Okeke, supra note 3 at 43. 
16 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode09/usc_sup_01_9_10_2.html. 
17 Okeke, supra note 3 at FN 158: The United States ratified the New York Convention under two reservations. The 
Convention only applies to matters considered commercial under United States law and on the basis of reciprocity. 
The nationality of the parties is subordinate to the arbitral situs. 
18 Okeke supra note 3 at 52-53. 
19 Id. 
  
6 
United States courts have also extended the application of the New York Convention to awards 
rendered in the United States between foreign parties.20
Article 103 of the English Arbitration Act of 199621 provides for arbitration awards to be 
enforced pursuant to the New York Convention and stipulates that recognition or enforcement of 
these awards may not be refused except in specific instances which are based on the grounds 
provided in the New York Convention.22 The Act does not distinguish between domestic and 
international arbitral awards, but certain specific provisions relate solely to recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.23  
While the  English Arbitration Act is largely influenced by the provisions of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985 (hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law)24, Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 
allows the parties to challenge an arbitration award on questions of law. If, however, the parties 
agree to waive such appeal, a challenge may be brought only under the grounds specifically 
listed in Section 68 of the Arbitration Act.25 Thus English Law provides the parties to the 
arbitration an opportunity to agree (prior to the dispute) whether the English courts will have the 
power to review the arbitral award on issues of law.26
                                                 
20 Okeke supra note 3 at 52-53. 
21 UK ST 1996 c 23 available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1996/1996023.htm. 
22 Dan C. Hulea, Contracting To Expand the Scope of Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: An American 
Perspective, 29 Brook. J. Int'l L. 313, 343. 
23 Id at 341. 
24 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 544: “The UNCITRAL Model Law establishes six bases for setting aside awards. 
They are: (1) invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate (2) lack of notice to a party or other inability to present the case 
(3) inclusion in the award of matters outside the scope of submission (4) irregularity in the composition of the 
tribunal (5) non-arbitrability of the subject matter (6) violation of domestic public policy”; see also The Text of the 
Model Law available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html. 
25 Hulea, supra note 22 at 342-343 
26 Id; Okeke, supra note 3 at 47-48. 
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The arbitration rules of Germany are set forth in Book X of the ZPO (German Code of 
Civil Procedure) (1985).27 The German arbitration laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.28 Similar to the English Arbitration Act, the German counterpart does not distinguish 
between domestic and international arbitration. Regarding the grounds of review of awards, the 
German statute provides a “definite and exclusive” list of grounds on which an award may be 
challenged.29
Articles 1484 and 1502 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure (NCPC) contain very 
specific provisions for setting aside arbitral awards and strictly stipulate that the setting aside of 
an arbitral award is available only in those cases; if parties invoke any other grounds, the 
reviewing court will not take those grounds into consideration because such grounds are not 
provided under the law.30  
In some countries such as Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden, judicial review of awards 
in arbitrations not involving any nationals or residents could be excluded by agreement of the 
parties, even for violation of the most basic procedural protections, the rationale behind such 
exclusion being that judicial review can still be conducted at the place where enforcement of the 
award is sought.31  
Article 1717 of the Belgian Code Judiciaire, introduced in 1984, stipulated that Belgian 
Courts had the authority to review an arbitral award only if at least one of the parties to the 
dispute was either an individual having Belgian nationality or residence or a legal entity 
                                                 
27 Hulea, supra note 22 at 345.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Hulea, supra note 22 at 344; Okeke, supra note 3 at 49; for the text of the code visit 
http://www.lexinter.net/ENGLISH/code_of_civil_procedure.htm. 
31 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55; Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, where this trend has 
been described as “Delocalization” or “Denationalization” of International Commercial Arbitration.   
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constituted in Belgium or had a subsidiary or other establishment in Belgium.32 Thus Article 
1717 completely denied Belgian courts the authority to review international awards where the 
parties were non-Belgian, even if the situs of the arbitration was Belgium.33 However, in 1998, 
the Belgian Law “stepped back” from its approach to state that the parties may, by agreement, 
exclude any application for the setting aside of an arbitral award, in case none of the parties had 
their domicile, residence or principal place of business in Belgium.34  
Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act lists very specific grounds for 
non-recognition of an award.35 However, Article 192 of the same law gives parties the option to 
agree to exclude one or all of those grounds, or to limit their recourse to one of the grounds 
provided in Article 190 but it applies only to cases where none of the parties to the arbitration 
have their domicile, residence, or principal place of business in Switzerland.36 Thus under Swiss 
arbitration law, there is a difference between the judicial review of foreign arbitral awards and 
domestic arbitral awards. The Swedish Arbitration Act contains similar provisions as the above-
mentioned Swiss Law.37
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55 
33 Hulea, supra note 22 at 346 
34 Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55 
35 Hulea, supra note 22 at 348. 
36 Id. 
37 Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179: “Section 51 of the Swedish Arbitration Act 199 provides, inter alia, 
that where none of the parties is domiciled or has its place of business in Sweden, such parties may in commercial 
relationship through an express written agreement exclude or limit the application of the grounds for setting aside an 
award… An award which is subject to such an agreement shall be recognized and enforced in Sweden in accordance 
with the rules applicable to a foreign award.” 
  
9 
B. Contractually Expanded Judicial Review 
 
As detailed above, most national arbitration statutes set very narrow limits for the review 
of arbitration awards.38 This factor, combined with the fear of arbitrary or “unprincipled” 
arbitration awards has led some contracting parties to augment their arbitration agreements with 
provisions expanding the scope of judicial review.39 Usually, such provisions call for judicial 
vacatur of arbitral awards for errors of law, errors of fact, or both.40  
 National laws differ on whether or not to allow parties to contract for expanded judicial 
review. The Arbitration Laws of England offer parties the possibility to expand judicial review 
beyond the grounds listed in the New York Convention, provided enforcement is not sought 
under the New York Convention, but under Articles 68 and 69 of the English Arbitration Act.41
Courts in the United States hold divergent opinions regarding contractually expanded 
judicial review of awards. Some courts have held that since “Arbitration is a creature of 
contract”, parties may contract to expand the review of awards.42 Other courts are of the opinion 
that parties cannot alter court process to their own needs.43  
                                                 
38 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 545. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 Hulea, supra note 22 at 342-343. 
42 Id at 335-340; Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of 
Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 151 (2002); Recent 
Case, Arbitration--Standard of Review--The Tenth Circuit Rejects Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards: Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001), 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1272 
(2002). 
43 Smit, supra note 2; Brian T. McCartney, Note, Contracting for Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Can an 
"Errors of Law" Clause Provide Two Bites of the Apple? 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 151, 151 (1997), Cynthia A. Murray, 
Note, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 76 St. Johns L. Rev. 633 (2002); Kevin Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 St. Louis L.J. 509 (2002). 
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Unlike courts in the United States, French courts have not been asked to decide whether 
to allow parties to contractually expand the judicial review of arbitral awards.44 In spite of this 
situation, scholars believe that if presented with this issue, the French courts’ response to such 
agreements would be in the negative.45 It is believed that in Germany, as in France, expanded 
review of arbitral awards will probably not be available even if parties had contracted for it.46 In 
the case of Belgian courts, experts believe that expanded judicial review will definitely not be 
available47, as in the case of Swiss Courts.48  
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Judicial review in the country where recognition or enforcement is sought has gained 
much uniformity due to the success of the New York Convention.49 In seeking enforcement of 
the award, the winning party to the arbitration will have to obtain an exequatur (order to execute) 
to render the award equivalent to a local court judgment, from the courts of the country where 
the enforcement is sought.50 In such proceedings, foreign awards are usually not reviewed on the 
merits but only on a limited number of grounds for procedural defects, which are more or less 
similar to the grounds under Article V of the Convention.51  
The New York Convention has been very successful in its efforts to provide a 
harmonized system for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
                                                 
44 Hulea, supra note 22 at 344 -345. 
45 Id. 
46 Id at 345. 
47 Id at 347. 
48 Hulea, supra note 22 at 348. 
49 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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However, this success is not without defects.52 The Convention, while providing uniform 
standards to decide the validity of arbitration agreements and awards,53 still leaves the 
interpretation of the standards to the discretion of national courts.54 Further, the Convention fails 
to provide a mechanism to solve the conflicts between national jurisdictions on matters relating 
to arbitration.55 Thus, no mechanism exists till date which can secure the uniform application of 
the provisions of the convention in national courts.56  
Evidently, there is a need for a permanent body of arbitral appeal such as the AARB that 
provides uniformity and singularity with respect to the appellate review of all arbitral awards. 
The replacement of judicial review with a single appellate review mechanism will eliminate 
much of the conflict, uncertainty and discrepancy that surround such review. Crucial 
determinations as to the validity of arbitral awards and agreements will no longer be left to the 
determination of national courts.57 Parties should contract that any option of review of an arbitral 
award should be available only through the AARB. Once an arbitral award has been rendered, 
any attempt to review the award may only be made through the AARB. There will be no 
challenge of the award at the place where the award is rendered or anywhere else. Further, by 
providing for a system of appeal that is reliable, parties will no longer fear unprincipled or 
capricious awards and hence they will not opt for expanded review provisions.  
 
                                                 
52 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 60. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
  
12 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF REVIEWING ARBITRAL AWARDS IN COURTS - HOW APPEAL 
THROUGH THE AARB WILL BE A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
 
 
Several arguments have been advanced against subjecting international arbitral awards to 
judicial review. The chief contentions are that judicial review leads to loss of confidentiality, 
relegates expertly rendered awards to generalized review by judges, affects the institutional 
integrity of the judicial and arbitral processes, adds additional burden to an already overworked 
judiciary, subjects international awards to possibly biased national reviews and leads to the 
problem of parallel proceedings.58 The following sections elaborate on these arguments. 
 
A. Loss of Confidentiality 
 
“People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the 
courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution 
by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are public 
rather than private property.”59
 
 
Confidentiality is mentioned as one of the chief reasons why parties choose arbitration 
over litigation. However, by involving courts in the proceeding, the parties acquire the risk of 
“sacrificing the secrecy of the arbitral forum for the presumptive openness of the courtroom”.60 
Highly confidential information of the parties will become known to competitors and others, and 
                                                 
58 Hulea, supra note 22, Okeke, supra note 3, Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 and Smit supra note 2. 
59 Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time To Let Some Sun Shine In On Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 81 CHIKLR 463 (2006)  quoting Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
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the advantage of arbitral confidentiality will be completely lost.61 As Dore aptly describes, 
“Once arbitration documents are filed with the court with a request for judicial action, they 
become judicial records subject to the right of public access. As with other judicial records, the 
court will assess whether the need for privacy outweighs any applicable public interest in 
disclosure… neither the arbitrator’s order nor the parties’ confidentiality agreement will 
necessarily bind the court”.62
 
National Laws and Confidentiality 
The decision of the Australian High Court in Esso63 has been described as a “nuclear 
event in Australia” whose “seismic tremors” were felt throughout the arbitration world.64 The 
Esso court rejected the view that a general duty of confidentiality existed in arbitration 
proceedings.65 The approach of the Esso court was followed by Sweden in the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank66 case. In the United States, no federal court above the district court level 
has ruled on this issue and the “handful” of district court decisions reject any implied duty of 
confidentiality.67 This is demonstrated by the leading case of United States v. Panhandle Eastern 
Corporation, 118 F.R.D. 346 (D.Del.1988). Thus it is evident that Australia, Sweden and the 
United States do not recognize a general legal obligation of confidentiality. 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 Doré, supra note 59 at 507. 
61 Knull & Rubins supra note 4 at 549. 
62 Doré, supra note 59; see THE LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE TO ARBITRATION (Lawrence W. 
Newman & Richard Hill eds., 2004) at 417-459. 
63 Esso Auatralia Resources Ltd and others v. The Hon Sidney James Plowman, The Minister for Energy and 
minerals and others, 10 Commonwealth Law Reports 183(1995). 
64 Gordon Smith & Meef Moh, Confidentiality of Arbitrations - Singapore's Position Following the Recent Case of 
Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v. Win Win Nu, 8 VJ 37 quoting Neill, P.,QC, “Confidentiality in Arbitration”, 
(1996) 12 Arbitration International 287. This article was based on the 1995 Bernstein lecture given under the 
auspices of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. 
65 Id at 38. 
66 Supreme Court, 27 October 2000, Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v. AI Trade Finance Inc, 15(11) Mealey’s 
IAR B1 (2000), 13(1) WTAM 147(2001). 
67 Jeffrey W. Sarles, Solving The Arbitral Confidentiality Conundrum In International Arbitration, available at 
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/article.asp?id=1006&nid=6. 
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Although there is no statutory provision in the English Arbitration Act of 1996, English 
law recognizes an implied term in arbitration agreements that the proceedings are private and 
confidential subject to certain limited qualifications or exceptions.68 The cases of Dolling-Baker 
v. Merrett,69 Hassneh Insurance Co. v. Mew70 and Ali Shipping v. Shipyard Trogir71 testify this. 
The recent English Court of Appeals judgment in the Bankers Trust72case confirmed that court 
proceedings which were related to arbitration were also confidential and the publication of a 
court judgment connected to the arbitration was barred.73
France holds a “pro-confidentiality” stance. This can be witnessed from the notable case 
of Aita v. Oijeh.74 In Aita, the Court of Appeal in Paris ruled that the very bringing of the 
proceedings violated the principle of confidentiality and therefore ordered the challenging party 
to pay significant costs to the other party for having caused in court a “bad faith” public debate 
on matters which should have remained confidential between the parties.75  
Two countries to statutorily provide for a duty of arbitral confidentiality are New Zealand 
and Bermuda. Section 14 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act (1996) provides that “An Arbitral 
agreement, unless other wise agreed by parties, is deemed to provide that the parties shall not 
publish, disclose or communicate any information relating to arbitral proceedings under the 
agreement or to an award made in those proceedings.”76 This enactment was done post Esso to 
                                                 
68 Sarles, supra note 67 at pages 3-4. 
69 [1991] 2 All ER 890. 
70 Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel and Others v Steuart J. v Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243. 
71 2 All E.R., 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 643 (Eng. Ct. App. 1998). 
72 Department of Economics, Policy & Development of the City of Moscow & another v. Bankers Trust and 
another[2005] QB 207, on appeal from the Commercial Court[2003] 1WLR 2885 (Cooke J.). 
73  V.V. Veeder , The Transparency of International Arbitration in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) at  92-98 
74 1986 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 583 (Cour d’Appel de Paris, Feb. 18, 1986). 
75 Sarles, supra note 67 at 4, Veeder, supra note 73 at 91. 
76  Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 443; Sarles, supra note 67 at 4. 
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prevent the Australian Esso decision from serving as a precedent in New Zealand’s courts.77 
However, in the subsequent case of TV New Zealand Ltd. v. Langley Productions Ltd,78 New 
Zealand’s constitutional requirement for public court hearing was give precedence over a party’s 
request for privacy and the details of a confidential arbitral award become public information.79
Another important example is the Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
of 1993 which added two important provisions relating to confidentiality: Section 45 and Section 
46.80 Between them, Sections 45 and 46 provide that any party to the proceedings may apply to 
opt out of open court proceedings and there is no judicial discretion to hold hearing in an open 
court. There is limited judicial discretion to direct that any information from a private hearing 
can be published. The publication of any judgment of “major legal interest” is permitted subject 
to the removal of names and other details of the case (if parties apply for such removal) and a 
delay in publication, not to exceed ten years.81
As is evident, there exists a huge difference in the way countries treat confidentiality. The 
words of Sarles aptly describe the situation:        
“These national differences generate uncertainty. For example, one cannot simply 
assume that an arbitration held in London will be universally subject to English 
confidentiality standards, because a confidentiality dispute will not necessarily be 
heard in the national courts of the arbitration situs. It might be raised in a pending 
enforcement action elsewhere or in the country where the information is 
disclosed.”82  
 
It has been suggested that in countries which do not recognize an implied duty of confidentiality, 
parties may expressly contract for it in their arbitration agreements.83 But the fact remains that 
                                                 
77 Sarles, supra note 67 at 4. 
78 Television New Zealand v. Langley Productions Ltd [2000] 2 NZLR 250 
79 Veeder, supra note 73 at 93. 
80 Id at 91-92. 
81 Id. 
82 Sarles, supra note 67 at 1. 
83 Id. 
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the parties, in their haste to “seal the deal”, often do not think that far ahead.84 Hence pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements are often silent on the question of confidentiality. Even if parties did 
incorporate provisions relating to confidentiality, there is no guarantee that national courts might 
enforce those provisions.85  
 One strong argument that has been advocated against keeping all arbitration proceedings 
confidential is that matters of public policy sometimes dictate the publicizing of certain 
confidential information. If such information was withheld, it would detrimentally affect the 
society at large.86 The American cases of Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite Aid Corp.87 and 
Malek v. 24 Hour Fitness88 demonstrate this fact.89  
 The absence of uniform national standards on confidentiality strongly warrants the 
establishment of a supranational body such as the AARB to ensure such uniformity and 
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings. An ideal solution would be to incorporate strong 
provisions to maintain party confidentiality with an equal regard for matters of public policy. In 
                                                 
84 Sarles, supra note 67 at 1. 
85 Id at 7-8. 
86 See generally Doré, supra note 59. 
87 345 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
88 No. NO3-1473 (Super. Ct. Cal., Contra Costa County, June 4, 2004) (unpublished). 
89 Doré, supra note 59 at 508 : In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., an employment dispute and a 
resulting coverage controversy arising out of a high-profile financial scandal concerning Rite Aid Corporation were 
submitted to confidential arbitration. Rite Aid's liability insurer sued to vacate the confidential arbitration award that 
required it to indemnify Rite Aid for a separate multimillion dollar arbitral award won by a former Rite Aid 
employee. Both the docket and record in the court proceedings were sealed by stipulation of the parties, who were 
negotiating a settlement of the underlying arbitration awards. In analyzing “whether it [was] appropriate for [the] 
case to remain shrouded under seal,” the district court sua sponte engaged in the balancing of interests applicable to 
the sealing of judicial records and proceedings. According to the Rite Aid court, neither the confidentiality of the 
arbitral forum nor the federal policy of encouraging arbitration, “trump[ed] the clear law and policy standards . . . for 
maintaining open and accessible records of legal matters for public scrutiny.” Instead, the significant public interest 
in the case required that the record be unsealed: [I]n light of the recent, well-publicized corporate scandals and fraud 
perpetrated on both the public and financial community, and pursuant to the common law public policy of open 
disclosure standards . . . for legal proceedings, allowing transparency into the unprecedented Rite Aid corporate 
scandal weighs heavily in favor of unsealing the record. The author also gives an description of the Malek case at 
FN 245:  “In Malek v. 24 Hour Fitness, No. NO3-1473 (Super. Ct. Cal., Contra Costa County, June 4, 2004) 
(unpublished), for example, an arbitrator awarded a victim of sexual harassment and retaliation substantial 
compensatory and punitive damages against her health club employer. Unlike Rite Aid, the underlying arbitration in 
Malek was not covered by a confidentiality agreement or rule. Although the health club sought to prevent disclosure 
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order to ensure that public welfare is not affected, confidentiality standards may be relaxed only 
in cases that warrant the release of such information.  
 
B. Lack of Expertise 
 
The specialized expertise for which arbitrators are often selected and which is of pivotal 
importance to the resolution of complex international disputes, is largely lost when review is 
conducted by a national court of general jurisdiction because judges are unlikely to possess 
extensive experience in dealing with technical details and other problems peculiar to 
international disputes.90  Opponents of judicial review opine that one of the main disadvantages 
of litigation is its failure to render suitable decisions for specialized disputes which require 
resolution by a party with expertise in the area of dispute.91 The technically or scientifically 
complex subject matter of many international transactions, added with the “interplay of legal 
regimes that can complicate even a relatively simple cross-border sale of goods” may require 
“expertise that is rarely found among judges, even in the most industrialized countries”.92
Opponents of judicial review also endorse the view that the prospect of (contractually) 
expanded or heightened judicial review might deter arbitrators from giving highly specialized 
solutions for which their help is sought, in the first place.  
                                                                                                                                                             
by satisfying the award, the successful plaintiff sued to reduce it to judgment. Both the arbitrator and the court 
refused the health club's requests for confidentiality.”  
90 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 550; Smit, supra note 2 at 152.     
91 See Robert H. Smit, General Commentary On The WIPO Arbitration Rules, Recommended Clauses, General 
Provisions And The WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, 9 AMRIARB 3,5 (1998).
92 Knull & Rubins,  supra note 4 at 540: The author further elaborates on expertise as follows: “The importance of 
this advantage is witnessed by the dominance of arbitration in settling construction disputes both domestically and 
internationally, with engineers and lawyers alike serving on specialized arbitration boards. Specialized arbitration 
rules for use in construction disputes include the Construction Industry Model Arbitration Rules (CIMAR) in use in 
the UK, the American Arbitration Association Construction Arbitration Rules, and the rules promulgated by the 
Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC)”. 
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In the words of Hans Smit:  
It enables parties to obtain satisfactory resolution of disputes by sophisticated 
arbitrators, especially selected for the purpose, by reference to legal rules that 
might not meet with approval in the lower courts, but would require pursuing 
appeals into the courts of highest instance. The contributions made by arbitrators, 
specially selected for their expertise and competence, to the proper development 
of the law should not be underestimated. Their ability to fashion creative solutions 
by reference to rules that properly promote the common good, but may not always 
be the ones endorsed by the (lower) courts, should be given free rein. Clearly, 
arbitrators might shun reasonable solutions if they had to worry that courts might 
not be willing or able to endorse the legal bases on which they rest. Arbitrators 
have made very significant contributions both to finding appropriate solutions and 
to promoting enlightened development of the law. Their readiness to do so would 
be affected unfavorably by broadening the scope of review by judges not 
specifically selected for their experience and independence.93
 
The Bowen94 decision supports the standpoint that an arbitrator chosen for his experience 
in the area tends to possess greater knowledge about the disputed subject than “ordinary judges 
or juries” thereby giving parties more confidence in the award rendered.95 However, through 
contractually expanded judicial review, arbitrators might be required to submit findings of fact 
and conclusions of law or be discouraged from seeking specialized solutions for fear that their 
decisions would be vacated on appeal.96 In the opinion of the court, such a policy would 
undermine the independence of the arbitrator and jeopardize the “simplicity, expediency, and 
cost-effectiveness of arbitration”.97 Arbitration would become “just another step in the litigation 
dance”.98 Additionally, contractually expanded review could put courts in the “awkward position 
                                                 
93 Smit, supra note 2 at 152.  
94 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). 
95 Sullivan, supra note 43 at 553 
96 Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review Of Arbitration Awards, 8 HVNLR 171,179 (2003), Bowen, 254 
F.3d 925 at 936. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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of having to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures”.99 Other court decisions and commentators 
have also expressed the importance of arbitrators’ expertise.100  
While some commentators warn that arbitrators’ “familiarity with a discipline often 
comes at the expense of complete impartiality”,101 courts themselves recognize the “tradeoff 
between expertise and impartiality” in arbitration.102 It is acknowledged that arbitrators may have 
had previous knowledge of the situation or the parties, but also presumed that they are 
sufficiently impartial to serve as arbitrators.103
It must be said that the quality of an arbitration proceeding depends upon the quality of 
the arbitrator.104 There will undoubtedly be a difference between an expert arbitrator’s appraisal 
of a dispute and a judge’s appraisal of the same dispute. Hence, it is advisable to opt for appellate 
arbitral review conducted by sophisticated technical and arbitral experts instead of judicial 
review. One of the propositions for the AARB is to enlist the services of such experts to function 
as arbitrators. 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Bowen, 254 F.3d 925 at 935; Goldman, supra note 96 at 179. 
100 International Produce Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (1981) expressing that “The most sought-after 
arbitrators are those who are prominent and experienced members of the specific business community in which the 
dispute to be arbitrated arose”; Stephen J. Ware, Teaching Arbitration Law, 14 AMRIARB 231(2003): “In addition 
to the (unwritten) presuppositions and understandings of the trade, some industries have elaborate written trade 
rules. An arbitrator's familiarity with these written rules can be an especially important factor in making a good 
arbitrator because in several of these industries arbitrators are expected to rely on these written rules in deciding 
cases”. The author cites various other commentators expressing a similar opinion. See also B.L.E. v. Canadian 
Pacific Railway, 2003 Carswell Alta 596, observing that “The Supreme Court of Canada has long noted the 
expertise of arbitrators and arbitration panels in general.”  
101 Stephanie Smith, Establishing Neutrality In Arbitrations Involving Closely-Knit Industries, 
 12 WAMREP 237 at 238.
102 Id. 
103 Id mentioning the following cases: Merit Insur. Co. v. Leatherby Insur. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (1983); Morelite 
Constr. Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (1984). 
104 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-30. 
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C. The Institutional Integrity Argument 
 
The Institutional Integrity Argument is perhaps the most raised contention against 
judicial review of arbitral awards. When parties decide that any unsatisfactory outcome of the 
arbitration process may be settled by judicial review, they may tend to seek expanded judicial 
review through contractual provisions.105 Expanded judicial review affects the institutional 
integrity of the court process and any form of judicial review, contractually expanded or not 
affects the integrity of the arbitral process. It is opined that “With respect to arbitral institutions, 
the argument is the need to shield against undue interference by the judiciary. In the case of the 
courts, institutional integrity presumably dictates that the freedom of parties to set the ground 
rules in arbitration does not extend beyond the arbitral process itself”106.  
Expanded judicial review sought by the parties has been both permitted107 and denied108 
by American Courts which hold contrasting views on the institutional integrity argument as do 
commentators who have both declined109 and endorsed110 the idea of contractually expanded 
review.  
                                                 
105 See generally Fils et Cables D’Acier de Lens v.Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
Gateway Tech. Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995);  Bowen,  
254 F.3d 925; Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)(LaPine II) and 
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp, 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005) where parties sought 
expanded judicial review through contractual provisions. 
106 Hulea, supra note 22 at 350.  
107 For example.,Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) ; Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Roadway Packaging 
Systems, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001);  Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 
452245,  (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997);  in re Gateway Tech. Inc.,  64 F.3d 993. 
108  In re Bowen, 254 F.3d 925; UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991); in re 
Kyocera Corp 391 F3d 987 (overruling the 1997 decision in Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 
884). 
109 Curtin, supra note 2 at 339; Smit, supra note 2 at 149; McCartney, supra note 43 at 151; Murray, supra note 43; 
Sullivan, supra note 43. 
110 Hulea, supra note 22 at 367; Maggio & Bales, supra note 42 and Recent Case, Arbitration--Standard of Review--
The Tenth Circuit Rejects Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Bowen v. Amoco 
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001), 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1267; Okeke supra note 3 at 56. 
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Similarly, there exist divergent opinions as to whether the institutional integrity of arbitration is 
affected by judicial review. Some commentators and courts111 observe that judicial review of an 
arbitral award amounts to undue interference of the courts in the arbitral process, while others 
opine that judicial review is a necessary tool to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process.112  
The establishment of the AARB is advocated as a solution that addresses the both these 
issues. By opting for review of awards to be conducted by the AARB, not only is the institutional 
integrity of arbitration preserved by making it free of judicial interference, but the judiciary is not 
subject to the whims and fancies of the contracting parties. The freedom of the contracting 
parties will be limited to the arbitral process. Further, by providing for a system of appeal for 
arbitral awards, there are significant chances to rectify erroneous or flawed awards, thereby 
protecting the interests of the disputing parties and ensuring parties’ faith in the arbitral process.  
 
D. Burden on the Judiciary 
 
Much has been said about the role of arbitration as an efficient means of mitigating 
congestion in the court system. Congress has acknowledged that arbitration is a quick and 
relatively inexpensive method of dispute resolution that relieves the burden on the federal 
                                                 
111 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) ( Stating that “The standards for judicial 
intervention are ... narrowly drawn to assure the basic integrity of the arbitration process without meddling in it.”); 
see Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998); Knull supra note 4 at 548:  
“Besides the potential lack of cross-border recognition of court orders to set aside awards, a losing party who 
appeals to the judicial system of any country undermines the true virtues of arbitration, to some degree injecting 
most of the disadvantages of the litigation process into arbitration at the appellate level. One European commentator 
has remarked that “it appears that the institution of arbitration is distorted, and even loses the essence of its value, if 
the arbitral procedure is followed by an external procedure before national tribunals.” At least one commentator has 
suggested that parties who enter into an agreement to arbitrate their disputes breach that agreement whenever they 
turn to courts for assistance not contemplated by the arbitration rules they have selected.” 
112 See Victoria L. C. Holstein, Co-Opting The Federal Judiciary: Contractual Expansion Of Judicial Review Of 
Arbitral Awards, 12 WAMREP 276 (2001), Okeke supra note 3 at 56. 
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courts.113 In Timken Co. v. United Steelworkers, 492 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974) it was 
opined that arbitration is “an expeditious and relatively inexpensive means of settling grievances 
and ... it obviates the enormous burden which would rest upon the judiciary if it should be 
required to settle, case by case, the endless number of grievances and disputes ...”. Chief Justice 
Burger in his speech to the American Bar Association on Jan. 24, 1982, endorsed the use of 
arbitration to reduce judicial backlog.114 Other commentators have also expressed the opinion 
that arbitration reduces the burden on the court system.115  To quote, “Arbitration, along with 
mediation and other forms of alternate dispute resolution, answers the public's need to resolve 
disputes in an expeditious, cost-effective and just manner, without further burdening the tax-
supported court system.”116 In the words of yet another commentator, “Whatever the original 
justifications or purposes of ADR, arbitration's current support from the judiciary and other 
federal and state entities, as well as the business community, is a function of two largely 
economic purposes. First, from a public-interest perspective, arbitration is intended to reduce the 
burden on courts, providing a “shift in cost from the public sector to private parties. Second, for 
private parties, arbitration is said to provide a flexible dispute resolution model, allowing parties 
to maximize efficiency.”117
While arbitration has the effect of lightening the burden on courts, the review of arbitral 
awards in courts has quite the opposite effect. A frequently-raised argument against contractually 
                                                 
113 Goldman, supra note 96 at 183; H.R. Rep. No. 96, at 2 (1924). 
114 H.R. Rep. No. 97-542 (1982); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration Of Future 
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts Or A Trap For The Unwary Consumer? 5 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 112 (1993) at 
FN 9 mentioning the various articles of Warren E. Burger: Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A.J. 
274, 277 (Mar. 1982) Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 Arb.J. 3, 3 (Sept. 1985); Warren 
E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.--A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976). 
115  Sally Engle Merry, Book Review, Disputing Without Culture, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2057, 2072 (1987) (noting that 
"ADR is usually justified by the congestion of the courts and the demand placed upon them by ordinary persons"). 
116 Lester H. Berkson, Demise Of Binding Arbitration In Nevada, 2-AUG NVLAW 15 (1994).  
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expanded judicial review is that it burdens an already overworked court system.118 The Bowen 
court has opined that expanded review might encourage a number of additional appeals.119 This 
would result in sacrificing the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration and further 
burden an already overburdened judiciary.120   
The La Pine court has opined that under expanded review, the reviewing court would be 
engaging in work different from what it would do if it had simply heard the case itself.121 The 
Eighth Circuit has observed that: “We have served notice that where arbitration is contemplated 
the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured judgments 
defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they 
bargain for and that arbitration is far different from adjudication”122 and “…parties may not force 
reviewing courts to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures”.123
In stark contrast to these opinions other courts and commentators have opined that 
(expanded) judicial review is not a burden on courts and that parties had the right to contract for 
such review, thus exemplifying the divide on this subject. In so stating, they reason that without 
judicial review, a party might so fear the work of a “maverick arbitrator” to give up the idea of 
arbitration altogether.124 “Expanded review is more burdensome than the narrow review provided 
for in Section 10 of the FAA. Nevertheless…it is quite possible that refusing to permit 
                                                                                                                                                             
117 Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without A Keel: Private Arbitration And The Need For Public 
Oversight Of Arbitrators, 87 IALR 1337 (2002). The author, however, argues that “Whether growing delays actually 
plague the public courts and whether arbitration achieves either of its economic purposes is debatable”. 
118 McCartney, supra note 43 at 162; Sullivan supra note 43 at 550-553; Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = 
Arbitration  Litigation? 4 HVNLR 231, 236 (1999).
119 Bowen, 254 F.3d 925 at 936. 
120 Bowen, 254 F.3d 925 at 936. 
121 Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
122 In reUHC Mgmt. Co., 148 F.3d 992, 998; Holstein, supra note 112 at 281. 
123 Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1525 (7th Cir.1989). 
124 Goldman, supra note 96 at 184.
  
24 
contractually expanded review will encourage parties to forego arbitration altogether and to 
litigate their entire dispute in federal court.”125  
It has also been stated that arbitration with expanded judicial review would place a lesser 
burden on the judiciary than full litigation in the court system.126 Commentator Goldman 
observes that: “Parties, by their agreement, are already permitted to increase the work of the 
judiciary. Choice of law provisions may require judges to spend extra hours in the library. 
Furthermore, clauses limiting which disputes are subject to arbitration also result in a heavier 
judicial workload, yet no one suggests that such clauses are improper or undermine judicial 
integrity”.127 He further reasons that “The fear that courts would be placed in the position of 
applying unfamiliar standards of review or appraising strange rules and procedures is overstated 
and does not justify a blanket rejection of clauses expanding judicial review. To date, every case 
providing for expanded judicial review has required substantial evidence either to support the 
arbitrator's award or to show that the arbitrator did not commit legal error. These are standards 
that courts routinely apply. Finally, Section 10 of the FAA and the judicially created exceptions 
to award confirmation already require courts to review arbitration awards. Expanded review does 
not make the procedures and rules of arbitration any more unfamiliar.”128
While the opinion of courts is anything but uniform on this issue, an interesting fact is 
that the same courts who found expanded review unacceptable have also endorsed the view of 
parties opting for appellate arbitral review. While the contractual expansion of judicial review 
                                                 
125  Goldman, supra note 96 at 186. 
126 La Pine Tech v Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884, 889; In re Fils Et. Cables D'Acier De Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240 at FN 9; 
Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What To Do? Expanded Judicial Review Of Arbitral Awards, 52 UKSLR 
429, 465: “Congress' intent in enacting the FAA was to permit parties' arbitration agreements to be enforced 
according to their terms, like any other contract. Moreover, if parties who want this safety net are denied it, they 
will simply impose the full burden of their disputes on the courts”. 
127 Goldman, supra note 96 at 186. 
128 Id.  
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was not permissible, desirable or appropriate, parties that sought additional review could appoint 
an appellate arbitration panel.129  
Irrespective of whether courts consider the review of arbitral awards a burden or not, 
review by an appellate arbitral body would definitely lighten their workload. The fact that courts 
themselves advocate appellate arbitral review adds further merit to the idea of the establishment 
of a body such as the AARB. 
 
E. Potential for Bias in National Courts 
 
One of the main reasons for parties to choose international arbitration is that it ensures 
neutrality. There is a tendency for parties to presume, rightly or wrongly, that the national courts 
of the opposing party would be biased against them or that judges are likely to be more 
sympathetic to their own countrymen.130 To avoid the “potentially biased” national courts of 
their opponents, parties in international commercial transactions enter into agreements that 
prevent national courts from deciding their case and instead place decision-making power in the 
hands of a neutral arbitral tribunal.131 By transferring decision making power from national 
courts to a private arbitral tribunal, parties obtain a “uniquely neutral forum for resolving their 
                                                 
129 La Pine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer reasoned that the parties' only alternative for 
expanded review was to provide for an appellate arbitration panel; Judge Posner, in Chicago Typographical Union., 
935 F.2d 1501 at 1504 -05, Judge Wollman in UHC Management, 148 F.3d 992, 998 and Judge Tascha in Bowen, 
254 F.3d 925 at 934 all express the opinion that if the contracting parties seek broader appellate review, they can opt 
for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award instead of judicial review. See Eric Van Ginkel, 
Reframing The Dilemma Of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review: Arbitral Appeal Vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPDRLJ 
157.   
130 Catherine A. Rogers, Fit And Function In Legal Ethics: Developing A Code Of Conduct For International 
Arbitration, 23 MIJIL 341, 408; See Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 537,538; see also Constantine Partasides, 
Solutions Offered by Transnational rules in Case of Interference by the Courts of the Seat in  IAI SERIES ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NO.3, TOWARDS A UNIFORM ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne- Veronique 
Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005). 
131 Rogers, supra note 130 at 409.
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disputes”.132 However, the benefits conferred by such a neutral tribunal would be totally lost if 
parties resorted to judicial review of the arbitral award in a national court with potential for bias 
and corruption. 
Evidence suggests that the fear of bias among parties is not totally unfounded, as the 
detailed description of the following cases illustrates: 
(1) Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia133
The dispute originally arose from an Energy Sales Contract (“ESC”) by which 
CalEnergy was to develop and exploit geothermal resources in Indonesia and sell 
the resulting energy to PLN, the Indonesian State Electricity Corporation. The 
ESC was priced in dollars. In the wake of South East Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s, and the collapse of the Indonesian Rupiah, PLN defaulted on its 
payment obligations under the ESC. Pursuant to an UNCITRAL arbitration clause 
in the ESC, CalEnergy brought arbitral proceedings and obtained an award in its 
favor. Following PLN’s failure to make payment pursuant to the award rendered 
against it, CalEnergy commenced further arbitral proceedings against the 
Republic of Indonesia itself under letters of comfort issued by the Ministry of 
Finance as security for PLN’s obligations under the ESC. These were also 
UNCITRAL proceedings, and the seats were Jakarta. Following the 
commencement of proceedings, the national oil company of Indonesia, Pertamina, 
which although a party to the original ESC had not been a party to the PLN 
arbitration and was not a party to the Republic of Indonesia arbitration, applied to 
the Central Court of Jakarta seeking an injunction suspending arbitral proceedings 
on grounds that were less than entirely clear. Pertamina alleged that its rights as a 
third party would be affected by the arbitration. The Jakarta Court duly issued an 
injunction, which in many respects was anomalous. The Arbitral Tribunal 
declined to suspend the arbitration, and convened witness hearings in The 
Hague.134 Following a failed attempt to obtain an injunction suspending the 
proceedings in The Netherlands, agents of the Republic of Indonesia intercepted 
one of the three arbitrators, an Indonesian national, at Schipol airport on the eve 
of the witness hearings in The Hague. The arbitrator was in no position to resist 
the pressures being brought to bear upon him, he was accompanied back to 
Jakarta. In the face of these events, the Arbitral tribunal proceeded in truncated 
form to render final awards against the Republic of Indonesia. The tribunal held 
that the injunction of the local court did not constitute “sufficient cause”; that the 
                                                 
132 Rogers, supra note 130 at 409.
133 Sept. 26, 1999 ad hoc Interim Award, Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, XXV Y.B. 
COM. ARB. 109 (2000); Oct. 16, 1999 ad hoc Final Award, Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of 
Indonesia, 15(2) INT’L ARB. REP. A1 (2000), XXV Y.B. COM. ARB. 109 (2000); October 16, 1999 ad hoc Final 
Award, Patuha Power Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, 15(2) INT’L ARB. REP. B1 (2000). 
134 Partasides, supra note 130 at 150-153.  
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legal basis for the injunctions was “unclear” and ultimately rendered its 
decision.135
 
(2) Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic136
In 1988, Petrobart (a Gibraltan company) delivered a large quantity of gas to 
Kyrgyzygazmunaizat (KGM), a company owned by the Kyrgyz Republic. After 
KGM had failed to pay for all of the gas, Petrobart obtained a favorable decision 
against it from a Kyrgyz Arbitration Court. Later, however, this court (with, it 
appeared, the informal support of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic) 
granted a stay of enforcement of that decision. KGM was then reorganized by 
presidential decree so that its assets (but not its liabilities) were transferred to 
other state entities, leaving the company insolvent. In 2003, Petrobart submitted a 
Request for Arbitration to the SCC Institute alleging that the Kyrgyz Republic 
was in breach of its obligations pursuant to the ECT. The tribunal first ruled that 
the ECT applied on a provisional basis to Gibraltar and then held that the Kyrgyz 
Republic failed to accord fair and equitable treatment to Petrobart's investment 
and, therefore, was in breach of Article 10(1) of the ECT. In reaching this 
conclusion, the tribunal highlighted the Kyrgyz Republic's decision to transfer 
assets out of KGM to the detriment of its creditors (including Petrobart). The 
tribunal also cited the State's intervention in the stay proceedings before the 
Kyrgyz Arbitration Court (again, to the detriment of Petrobart). Indeed, that 
intervention, the tribunal found, was itself a breach of the State's obligation to 
provide an effective means for the enforcement of investment rights under its 
domestic law (under Clause 10(12) of the ECT) In a final award issued under the 
auspices of the Arbitration Institute for the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(the SCC Institute), recently made public, an arbitral tribunal upheld Petrobart 
Limited's claim alleging breaches of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) by the 
Kyrgyz Republic.137
 
In Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon & Davis138, a Brussels court ordered execution of an ICC 
award that had been set aside after a merits review by an Algerian court at the seat of arbitration 
in Algiers. It is likely that the Belgian court suspected political interference at the arbitral situs 
because the Algerian defendant was the national gas agency which was among the most powerful 
of state agencies in Algeria.139  
                                                 
135 Partasides, supra note 130 at 150-153. 
136 Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award Case No. 126/2003, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Inst. (Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investsd_petrobart_kyrgyz.pdf.  
137 Vera van Houtte, Stephan Wilske & Michael Young, What's New in European Arbitration? 60-JAN DRJ 7.        
138 Judgment of Dec. 6, 1988, Trib. pr. inst. de Bruxelles, aff'd, Judgment of Jan. 9, 1990, Cour d'appel de Bruxelles 
(8e chambre) (Belg.). 
139 William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30 TXILJ 135 at FN 274.
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The above-mentioned examples illustrate a certainty of bias, rather than a supposed 
possibility. Sometimes the bias transgresses to the extent of actual, physical threat as the 
Himpurna case illustrates. It must be noted that “possibility of bias” exists not only in the courts 
of developing nations because of their “presumed lack of judicial independence or their 
vulnerability to corruption”.140 Bias against foreign defendants is said to be present in all 
countries, including the United States.141 Hence, if parties need to obtain a uniquely neutral, truly 
transnational forum for appealing arbitral awards, an ideal solution would be an institution such 
as the AARB. The neutrality and impartiality of the AARB would be yet another asset in the list 
of the previously - mentioned several advantages. 
 
F. The Problems of Parallel Proceedings 
 
In international commercial arbitration proceedings, when a losing party seeks to set 
aside or vacate an award on one hand and the winning party seeks to enforce the same award on 
the other hand, it gives rise to parallel proceedings in different national courts, each with its own 
laws and procedural standards.142 Litigants find it difficult to stay court proceedings in one 
jurisdiction on the basis of ongoing litigation in another country.143 However, it must be 
mentioned that parallel proceedings do not arise only in cases of post-award enforcement in 
national courts; there are a number of other possibilities where parallel proceedings may occur in 
international arbitration - for instance, between an international court and an international 
                                                 
140 Rogers, supra note 130 at 408-409.
141 Id.  
142 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 537,  see also BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 13; see Karaha 
Bordas Co LLC (KBC) v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) and PT, PLN 
(Persero), Decision of 18 December 2000, 16(3) Mealey’s IAR C-2 (2001); Emmanuel Gaillard: Reflections on the 
Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Loukas A. 
Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) at 208-211. 
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tribunal, a state court and an international tribunal and between two arbitral tribunals.144 This is 
due to the fact that there is no uniform standard for dealing with parallel proceedings 
internationally.145  
Attempts have been made to prevent parallel proceedings through the application of the 
lis pendens doctrine. The doctrine of lis pendens (literally meaning suit pending) is a “general 
principle of international law”146 which is invoked to prevent two judicial bodies from dealing 
with the same dispute at the same time. While the doctrine of lis pendens has been successfully 
applied to stall simultaneous proceedings in some cases147, there are also cases where its 
application has been rejected.148  
 
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions 
The European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters of 1968 (hereinafter Brussels Convention)149 and the EFTA Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1988 
                                                                                                                                                             
143 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 537 
144 Norah Gallagher, Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens : Problems and Possible Solutions in 
PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 
2006) at 331; see The Hub Power Company Limited v. Pakistan WAPDA and Federation of Pakistan, 16 Arb. Int'l 
439 (2000), reprinted in 15 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. A-1 (2000); Benvenuti &Bonfant v. People’s Republic o f 
Congo, ICSID Case No. ArB/77/2, VIII YBCA 144 (1983); Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA v. Colon 
Container Terminal SA, Swiss Tribunal 14 May 2001, XXIX YBCA809 (2004); Southern Bluefin Tuna Case 
Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 4 Aug 2000, para 52, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/bluefintuna/award080400.pdf; Laker Airways, Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian 
World Airlines, 731 F. 2d 909, (D.C. Cir 1984), Donohue v. Amco Inc. and Others, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 649 (Q.B. 1999); 
see BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 13-15. 
145 Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides Of The Coin: A Decade Of Parallel Proceedings And Enforcement Of Foreign 
Judgments In Transnational Litigation, 10 RWULR 1,9(2004); see Nadine Balkanyi-Nordmann, The Perils of 
Parallel Proceedings: Is an Arbitration Award Enforceable If the Same Case Is Pending Elsewhere? in 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADR (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi 
eds., 2006) at 185. 
146 Gallagher, supra note 144 at 334. 
147  Id. See in re Fomento  supra note 144, J.P. Morgan Europe Ltd. v. Primacom AG [2005] EWHC 508 
148 See generally Gallagher, supra note 144; see in re Benvenuti supra note 144; see also the following: SGS v 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm; Czech 
Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Svea Court of Appeal Case no. T 8735-01, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME2003-SveaCourtofAppeal_001.pdf
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(hereinafter Lugano Convention)150 have addressed the issue of simultaneous proceedings in an 
attempt to bring uniformity among countries.151  The key feature of the lis pendens doctrine, as 
set forth in the conventions is to prevent parallel proceedings and conflicting results in different 
contracting states. Article 21 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions152 provides that:  
“Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties are brought in courts of different Contracting States, any court other than 
the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time 
as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. Where the jurisdiction of 
the court first seized is established, any court other than the court first seized shall 
decline jurisdiction in favor of that court.”153
 
As per the conventions, the court of the second filed action may not interfere with the 
court of first filed action.154 In the United States, courts sometimes apply a presumption favoring 
the first-filed suit, and this denotes the date of filing of the plaintiff's complaint with the court 
clerk. There are no known cases in the United States where this is a problem.155 In Europe 
however, the application of the “first-seized” rule is anything but conclusive.156 For instance, in 
Sweden, the court is seized of jurisdiction when the case is filed, while in Germany, it is 
perceived that jurisdiction is not seized until the defendant is served. This lack of uniformity is 
described by the following example: “When a party sues a defendant in a German court but does 
not immediately perfect service of process, the defendant can quickly sue in Sweden (assuming 
the German plaintiff's amenability), and if the Swedish filing predates the German service of 
process, the Swedish case prevails and the earlier-filed German case must be dismissed”.157  
                                                                                                                                                             
149 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux.htm. 
150 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/lug-idx.htm. 
151  James P. George, International Parallel Litigation--A Survey Of Current Conventions And Model Laws, 37 
TXILJ 499 (2002).
152 Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 191stating : The articles are identical due to Protocol No. 2 
153 Id. 
154 George, supra note 151 at 531. 
155 Id. 
156 George, supra note 151 at 531. 
157 Id. 
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This discrepancy among countries which are party to the Brussels conventions only 
serves to illustrate the lack of uniformity among national laws and its direct bearing on 
international arbitration proceedings.158
Lis pendens rules often apply only to parallel actions involving the same parties and the 
same claims or causes of action. It is unclear as to how “same” they must be to qualify for a stay 
or dismissal.159 The degree of requisite “sameness” is apparently left to the discretion of the 
judges in the absence of any guidelines to evaluate the “sameness”.160 Another key issue is that 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions rules apply only to participating nations. Therefore, there 
are no provisions to deal with simultaneous proceedings when one of the contracting states is not 
a party to the conventions.161
As with other problems in international commercial arbitration today, there are no 
uniform measures to effectively address the issue of parallel proceedings. While the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions are undoubtedly steps in the right direction162, there are still areas that have 
not been satisfactorily addressed, as described above.  
It has been suggested that the complete harmonization of the lis pendens issue can be 
achieved by an international convention to that effect.163 Instead, the problem of parallel 
proceedings and related issues of enforcement due to simultaneous proceedings in national courts 
or otherwise can be addressed with the same solution that has been advocated to several other 
problems in this thesis – the establishment of the AARB.164  If parties agree through well-defined 
                                                 
158 Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 191;George, supra note 151 at 531. 
159 George, supra note 151 at 510. 
160 See id. 
161 See Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 197. 
162 See id generally. 
163 See Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 201. 
164 Infra generally. 
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provisions to bring any requests for appeal to the AARB only and waive the right to pursue any 
other appeal option, the “perils”165 of parallel proceedings will be eradicated.  
 
G. Conclusion 
 
The above-mentioned arguments clearly highlight the fact that subjecting arbitral awards 
to judicial review creates certain distinct problems, both to the arbitrating parties and the 
institution of arbitration. It is evident that by resorting to appellate review through the AARB, 
arbitrating parties and the institution of arbitration will be free from the problems posed by 
judicial review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 185. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE NEED FOR THE AARB 
 
“Lack of appeal does not bring finality.”166
 
Considering the disadvantages posed by judicial review and the merits of appellate 
arbitral review as detailed above, it is not unreasonable to assume that parties who are prepared 
to agree to international arbitration but desire some protection against arbitrary awards would 
prefer an arbitral review to judicial review.167 Currently there is no universal extra-judicial body 
for dealing with appellate review of all international commercial arbitral awards. 
 
A. Existing Avenues of Appellate Arbitral Review 
 
As previously mentioned, the losing party in arbitration can seek an appeal of the award 
in national courts at the place of arbitration or enforcement168 or with the institution that rendered 
the award. Most national statutes provide extremely limited grounds for judicial review of 
arbitral awards169 and courts are divided on the concept of contractually expanded review.170 
Similarly, most major arbitral institutions provide extremely limited grounds of review for 
awards rendered by them. While the appeal provisions of most institutions include measures to 
                                                 
166 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 542. 
167 Id at 550. 
168 Infra Chapter II. 
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170 Id.   
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correct clerical or mathematical errors171, they do not contain any provisions to review or alter 
the merits of the award172, even if the decree is based on flawed reasoning, incorrect application 
of the law173 or contains substantive errors174. James M. Gaitis mentions several possible 
scenarios of misapplication of law:  
“The arbitral tribunal might wrongly determine that the applicable law does not 
permit an award of prejudgment interest in a particular arbitration, or the tribunal 
might apply an incorrect statute of limitations. The tribunal might inadvertently 
fail to recognize that the parties’ contract mandates, and the law permits, an award 
of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, or might misinterpret the law relating to 
fiduciary duties. The tribunal might misapprehend the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, or incorrectly describe the force and effect of administrative regulations-
for example, oil and gas regulations regarding the correlative rights of interest 
owners. Allusions to the law of other jurisdictions, and the ensuing reliance on the 
law of those jurisdictions, might be based on a misunderstanding of that law. The 
tribunal might incorrectly conclude dicta in a decision actually constitute a formal 
holding. Simple statutes and complex bilateral investment treaties might be 
misread, and the language of cases and statutes alike might be misquoted and 
misapplied”.175                                
 
In addition to the above-mentioned possibilities, there is also the risk that an arbitrator 
“grossly misinterprets a contract or grants hugely disproportionate remedies”.176 In several high 
profile and “untold” lower profile arbitrations, arbitrators have rendered decisions that have 
fallen well outside the expectations of the parties.177 There may be other justifiable reasons why 
parties may seek to appeal an award. The appeal mechanisms of existing arbitral institutions do 
not provide appellate provisions that address the above-mentioned scenarios.178
 
                                                 
171 Knull &Rubins, supra note 4 at 543; James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The 
Need For A Limited Opportunity For Arbitral Reconsideration Of Reasoned Awards, 15 AMRIARB 9 (2004).
172 Gaitis supra note 171 at 24. 
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174 Id.  
175 Id at 18, 19 and the cases mentioned therein. 
176 Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration, 63 ALB. L. REV 241 
(1999). 
177 Id at 249-251; see Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1012 (Cal. 1994), see also Koch 
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B. Rules of Various Arbitration Institutions 
 
Article 29 of the International Chamber of Commerce (1998) (hereinafter ICC) Rules of 
Arbitration179 states that “On its own initiative, the Arbitral Tribunal may correct a clerical, 
computational or typographical error, or any errors of similar nature contained in an Award, 
provided such correction is submitted for approval to the Court within 30 days of the date of 
such Award”. There are no provisions whatsoever to alter incorrect applications of law or 
objective evidence.180 The provisions of Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Model Law181 are 
identical to the above-mentioned provisions of ICC Article 29. The Model Law does not provide 
recourse to review or alter awards on any other basis.182  
The rules of other Arbitration Institutions, such as Article 27 of the London Court of 
International Arbitration (1998) (hereinafter LCIA)183 and Article 66 of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (hereinafter WIPO) Arbitration Rules184 provide that the arbitral tribunal 
may correct awards containing computational, typographical or clerical errors only.185 As in the 
case of the ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules, they do not provide for other recourse to 
review or alter the award. However, the rules of both the LCA and the WIPO provide that a party 
may request the Arbitral Tribunal to make an additional award as to claims or counterclaims 
                                                                                                                                                             
178 E.g., Hyle vs. Doctor’s Associates Inc.,198 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1999). 
179 International Chamber of Commerce Available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf_documents/rules/rules_arb_english.pdf. 
180 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 543. 
181 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf. 
182 Gaitis supra note 171 at 24. 
183 Available at http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/ARB_DOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/rules.pdf. 
184 Available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/wipo/WIPAR2e.asp#awards. 
185 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 543; Gaitis supra note 171 at 25. 
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presented in the arbitration but not determined in any award within thirty days of rendering the 
award.186   
Art. 37 of the Rules of Arbitration, Institute of Stockholm Chamber Of Commerce 
(1999)187 contains similar provisions in providing that the tribunal may correct miscalculation or 
clerical error, provide written interpretation of award, or decide additional questions submitted 
but not previously decided.188 The Rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Association (IACAC)189 are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions and contain similar 
provisions.190
The provisions relating to appeal of awards of the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (hereinafter ICSID) are contained in Chapter VII of the ICSID Rules under 
“Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award.”191 Under these provisions, a losing 
party may request the Chairman of the ICSID’s Administrative Council to appoint a three-
member panel to review an award.192 While the scope of review of awards is limited,193 it is 
certainly more elaborate than any of the aforementioned rules. Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention Rules provides that an award may be reversed under the following conditions: that 
the Tribunal was not properly constituted; that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; that there has been a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or that the award has failed to state the reasons 
on which it is based.194 It is apparent that grounds for overturning an award are narrowly 
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constructed under the ICSID rules.195 The ICSID does not offer expedited appeal of awards, and 
the appeal proceedings are similar to original proceedings in all aspects.196 Article 53 of the 
ICSID convention states that “(t)he award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject 
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention”, thereby 
excluding the possibility of any judicial review of the award.197
The Center for Public Resources (hereinafter CPR) based in New York is the first major 
private commercial arbitration institution to establish separate, optional rules governing appeals 
procedures.198 The CPR’s appeal procedures are limited to arbitrations conducted in the United 
States.199 The Appeal Procedure of the CPR provides broad grounds of appeal in comparison 
with the rules of other institutions.200 The CPR rules provide that the appeals tribunal may annul 
the original award and replace it with a new, binding decision.201 Rule 8 of the CPR provides the 
following six grounds of appeal based on which the original award may be modified or set aside:  
(1) If the original award contains material and prejudicial errors of law of such a nature that it 
does not rest upon any appropriate legal basis;  
(2) The award is based upon factual findings clearly unsupported by the record; 
(3) If the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; 
(4) If there is evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators; 
(5) If arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed powers;  
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(6) If the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, or refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of a party are prejudiced.202
From the above-mentioned analysis of the rules of various institutions, it is apparent that 
the existing major arbitral institutions do not offer the option of an appeal procedure to parties 
even in cases of erroneous misapplication of law or other justifiable circumstances, leaving 
parties no option but to seek appeal in courts.203 Since national courts also limit the grounds of 
review, the party afflicted by such “maverick” arbitration awards is often left with no recourse. 
As an alternative, parties may opt for ad hoc arbitral tribunals to hear their appeals. However, ad 
hoc arbitration does not offer certain advantages to parties that are available with institutional 
arbitration. The advantages and disadvantages of ad hoc tribunals as compared to institutional 
arbitration are detailed in the following pages. 
 
C. Ad hoc vs. Institutional Arbitration 
 
Arbitration may be classified into two types based on the method in which the arbitral 
proceedings are conducted: ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration.204 Ad hoc arbitration 
                                                 
202 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 555. 
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22391079, *1 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Oct. 21, 2003 (tribunal, “through oversight,” failed to provide for a contractually 
agreed setoff valued at $800,000) Monscharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 28 (Cal. 1992) ( held that award will 
not be overturned even when an error of law appears on the face of the award). 
204 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-4; RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 4. 
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may be defined as arbitration without formalized rules or procedures; that has been specifically 
engineered for the particular agreement or dispute205; it is arbitration which is not conducted or 
administered by any institution or according to the rules of any institution206. Institutional 
arbitration, as is evident, is arbitration administered or conducted by an existing institution, 
according to the rules of that institution.207 The rules relating to the arbitration proceedings208 
and the extent of involvement in the administration of the arbitration varies with each 
institution.209 There are advantages and disadvantages to both these systems. 
 
D. Advantages of Ad hoc Arbitration 
 
The defining characteristic of ad hoc arbitration is that it is independent of any 
institution.210 Ad hoc arbitration processes do not possess any procedures for conducting 
arbitration proceedings; parties have the freedom to choose any procedure and law that they 
desire.211 In cases where the parties do not choose the applicable rules, the arbitrators tend to 
                                                 
205 See www.edcostello.com. 
206  LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-12: “The one exception where there may be the involvement of an institution in 
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conduct the proceedings in a manner that they deem appropriate.212   The advantages of ad hoc 
arbitration are as follows: 
(1) The chief advantage of ad hoc arbitration is flexibility. As described above, an ad hoc 
procedure can be shaped to meet the needs and requirements of the parties and the facts of the 
particular dispute.213 Ad hoc arbitration is also a good alternative when parties cannot agree on 
an arbitration institution.214
(2)  Another advantage of ad hoc arbitration is that parties to the arbitration have more control 
over the procedure rather than be subjected to the control of the administering institution.215
(3) Yet another advantage is significant savings in terms of costs and time for the parties. Since 
most arbitration institutions charge administrative fees, parties can save on such fees and other 
associated costs when they opt for ad hoc arbitration. Similarly, parties can save time by 
avoiding the internal procedures and other time periods associated with institutional 
arbitration.216  
The promulgation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules217 gave a major boost to ad hoc 
arbitration.218 Adopted by UNCITRAL on 28 April 1976, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial relationship; prior to the establishment of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
requirements to reflect the specific characteristics of the contract in dispute”; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 2 (2006). 
212 Asken, supra note 210 at III. 
213Id  
214 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-14. 
215 Id. 
216 Asken, supra note 210 at III:  “Since most arbitral institutions charge fees for their administrative services, the 
parties save the administration fees when they opt for ad hoc arbitration”, however, a contrasting argument is 
presented by LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-16: “A perceived but not necessarily correct advantage of ad hoc 
arbitration is that, because the parties control the process, it can be less expensive than institutional arbitration. In 
fact this depends in each case and on how the institution charges for its arbitration services”.  
217Available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html. 
218 Asken, supra note 210 at III. 
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rules, parties had to draft their own procedures or rely on arbitrators to provide the procedures.219 
The Rules and are widely used in many ad hoc arbitrations (as well as administered 
arbitrations).220 The Rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a model arbitration 
clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitration and the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings and establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the 
award221 and can be regarded as a substitute for the rules of Arbitral Institutions. The rules can be 
readily adopted by parties.222 Other recent alternatives for ad hoc arbitrations include the 
“Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two 
Parties of Which Only One is a State” promulgated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration223 and 
the rules for non-administered international arbitrations published by the CPR Institute for 
Dispute Resolution.224
Ad hoc arbitration requires the complete cooperation of the parties and their legal 
representatives.225 In the words of Alan Redfern, “if such cooperation is forthcoming, the 
difference between ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration is like the difference between a 
tailor made suit and one which is bought off the peg”.226 Such cooperation is, however, difficult 
to achieve when parties are at odds with each other and given such a situation, parties will not 
reach an agreement on any issue, leave alone issues of choice of laws or administrative 
procedures.227
                                                 
219 Asken, supra note 210 at III. 
220 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 2-35. 
221 See id at 2-36. 
222 Asken, supra note 210 at III. 
223 Born, supra note 211 at 61. 
224 Id. 
225 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 39; Asken, supra note 210 at III; see Born, supra note 211 at 60. 
226 Asken, supra note 210 at III. 
227 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 39. 
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With ad hoc arbitrations there exists a dilemma in drafting the dispute resolution clauses: 
“Before the dispute arises, the parties lack the necessary information about the dispute to really 
cover all aspects that might become irrelevant-unless they cover every contingency, which, if not 
impossible, will be too expensive to do. And once the dispute has materialized, the parties are 
often too much at odds with each other-and may be too preoccupied with tactical considerations- 
to reach agreement about the many issues that have to be covered.”228  This dilemma does not 
exist in institutional arbitration in that the dispute resolution rules drafted by institutions are 
detailed enough to cover a wide variety of situations.229 More importantly, the institution 
provides for a neutral authority that can resolve procedural issues and deadlocks.230
Another disadvantage of ad hoc arbitration is that in cases where the parties do not 
choose the applicable rules, the arbitrators tend to conduct the proceedings in a manner that they 
deem appropriate.231 This lends much unpredictability to the outcome of the proceedings. Most 
importantly, ad hoc arbitration lacks the predictability, security and administrative effectiveness 
that reputed established arbitration institution offer.232
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
228 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 39. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-13. 
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E. Advantages of Institutional Arbitration 
 
The chief advantages of Institutional Arbitration are as follows:        
(1) In institutional arbitration, parties can “take comfort” in the well established rules and 
procedures of the institution. There is a sense of security and guarantee when the arbitration 
proceedings are handles by an institution of repute.233
(2) The arbitrators appointed or suggested by institutions are well-qualified to resolve the dispute 
at hand. Institutions typically follow a thorough selection process when selecting arbitrators.234
(3) Parties do not have to concern themselves with various aspects of handling the arbitration. 
The administration of the arbitration process is dealt with in a professional and experienced 
manner. The institution will provide a wide variety of services that cannot be matched by ad hoc 
arbitration.235
Arbitral institutions gain judicial respect by virtue of their proven track record in 
handling arbitration proceedings. When the institution has an established record of handling all 
procedural and substantive aspects of the arbitration in a meritorious and thorough manner, 
courts are inclined to confirm the awards rendered by that institution.236 This is a singular 
advantage of institutional arbitration over ad hoc arbitrations. A key benefit is the increasing 
recognition of arbitral institutions by national courts and the evidence of increasing judicial 
                                                                                                                                                             
232 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1at 3-21, see also BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 36.  
233 BÜHRING-UHLE, ET AL supra note 8 at 36; Asken, supra note 210 at IV; LEW ET AL., supra note 1at 3-21, 
3-22.  
234 Asken, supra note 210 at IV. 
235 Id. 
236 Asken, supra note 210 at IV, explaining the deference of courts to arbitration institutions as follows: “Several 
institutions have enjoyed notable success due to their long and proven track records. England has accepted the 
reference to ICC Rules as evidencing an intent to opt out of appeals to the national courts of that country. The U.S. 
Supreme Court permitted the ICC and American Arbitration Association (AAA) to file amicus curiae briefs as 
friends of the court on the procedures of international arbitration in the most important international arbitration 
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deference to established arbitration institutions can be witnessed from a number of cases.237  On 
the other hand, the advantages of  an institutional award only materialize when the award is not 
contradicted by a national court which vacates or refuses to enforce the award; there have been 
instances  where awards of established institutions were rendered obsolete by national courts.238
Many international practitioners advocate institutional arbitration rather than ad hoc 
arbitration.239 Their recommendation is based on the enhanced predictability and regularity that 
institutional arbitration provides, apart from the benefits of incorporating institutional rules.240 
Though the advantages of institutional arbitrations outweigh the advantages of ad hoc arbitration, 
it remains that parties do not have sufficient recourse to appeal in the existing arbitration 
institutions.241 In such cases, and cases where parties do not wish to opt for ad hoc appeal, they 
will have no option but to choose the court system. Hence, it is imminent that we provide a 
source of appellate arbitral relief through a supranational institution that provides the security 
and guarantee of a court system within the realm of the arbitration system itself. The 
establishment of the AARB will undoubtedly provide the much-needed effective, predictable, 
secure and reputable source of appeal of arbitral awards. 
                                                                                                                                                             
decided in the U.S. in the last decade. Indeed, the Supreme Court in that case cited to the ICC’s brief in expanding 
the range of issues resolvable in international arbitration.” See BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 38. 
237 Asken supra note 210 mentioning the following cases: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. V. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 
105 S. Ct. 3346, (1985); Arab African Energy Corp. Ltd. V. Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., [1983] Lloyd's Rep. 419 
(Q.B.); Appollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg., 886 F.2d 469, 473-74 (1st Cir. 1989); Daiei, Inc. v. United States Shoe 
Corp., 755 F.Supp. 299, 303 (D. Haw. 1991) and Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v.. Carte Blanche 
International Ltd., 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1989).  
238 See S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd. And Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. The Arab Republic of Egypt and the 
Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels, 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983); BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra 
note 8 at 37. 
239 BORN, supra note 211 at 59: “Many international arbitration practitioners fairly decisively recommend 
institutional arbitration, rather than ad hoc arbitration. They do so primarily because of the enhanced predictability 
and regularity that institutional arbitration provides, as well as the benefits of incorporating institutional rules (e.g., 
provisions concerning formation of the arbitral tribunal, limitations on judicial review). Particularly at the outset of 
an arbitration, between sometimes inexperienced parties from different legal cultures, an institution’s role in moving 
proceedings along can be highly constructive and efficient.” 
240 Id. 
241 Infra at pages 34-39. 
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F. Conclusion 
 
Arbitration is a system of dispute resolution that has been created on the fundamental 
bases of “efficiency” and “finality”.242 The failure of major arbitration institutions to provide an 
appellate review procedure can be attributed to the belief that appellate review of awards 
undermines the efficiency of the arbitration system in addition to toying with the finality of the 
award.243 However, in their quest to protect arbitration, those institutions have failed to provide 
an effective means for the rectification of  awards that may be based on flawed reasoning or 
contain substantive errors or be well outside the scope of the arbitrator’s decision-making 
powers.244 Instead of adding strength to the system of arbitration, this has resulted in parties 
turning the other way and looking upon the judicial system to address issues that could have well 
been addressed within the arbitral system.245 As a way of ensuring fairness in the system of 
arbitration and  balancing the best interests of the arbitrating parties with the fundamental 
integrity of the arbitration process, appellate review of arbitral awards must be incorporated 
within the system of arbitration. The establishment of the AARB arbitration will undoubtedly 
achieve that result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
242 Gaitis, supra note 171 at 13. 
243 Id.  
244 Infra at pages 34-39. 
245 Id at page 39. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AARB 
 
The AARB must be modeled on principles of finality of the award, easy enforcement and 
recognition, binding decisions on member states, speedy and cost effective resolution, arbitrators 
with expertise, a neutral system of laws, impartial arbitrators bound by a strong moral code, 
equal representation of arbitrators and reasonable scope of review, all of which have been 
mentioned as the important advantages of arbitration.246 Establishing the AARB on the suggested 
principles will make it an ideal source of appeal for arbitral awards rendered throughout the 
world. Just as countries need the AARB for the regulating and unifying the appeal of arbitral 
awards, the AARB needs the ratification of countries in order to be established. Hence, it is 
                                                 
246 See Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416: According to the opinion of arbitration experts, the most important 
and valuable advantages of arbitration are the following: “neutral forum, international enforcement by treaty, 
confidential procedure, expertise of the tribunal, lack of appeal, limited discovery, speed, more amicable, greater 
degree of voluntary compliance, less costly procedure and more predictable results”;  see also  William S. Fiske, 
Should Small And Medium-Size American Businesses “Going Global” Use International Commercial Arbitration? 
18 TRNATLAW 455 (2005) at 461-462, where the author mentions the following as reasons why arbitration is 
chosen over litigation: “The trend towards arbitrators, rather than judges, is increasing for a number of reasons.  
First, arbitration is a very private process compared to public trials that generate public records.  Second, parties can 
agree the dispute resolution procedure will be neutral with regard to the nationality of the arbitrators, applicable law, 
venue, and language. Third, disputes arising from complex international agreements are best handled by arbitrators 
with expertise in the relevant field, rather than potentially biased and unsophisticated judges and juries.  Fourth, 
arbitration is generally an affordable alternative to costly adjudication.  Fifth, specialized types of arbitrations are 
available for quick and efficient arbitral procedures, which is ideal for transnational businesses that aim to keep 
operations running as usual. In comparison, public courts often have heavy caseloads that retard issue resolution. 
Sixth, arbitrators are generally interested in reaching a decision through a process that preserves the ongoing 
business relations between the parties. This emphasis on flexibility to the parties' needs contrasts with a common 
law adversarial system that encourages "dyed-in-the-wool, hard-edge, brass knuckles U.S. litigation tactics" that 
often destroy business relationships. Seventh, parties are able to contract for the substantive and procedural law 
governing the arbitration. Their choice of law selection is overwhelmingly respected by arbitration institutions, 
arbitrators and courts enforcing the arbitral award. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, contracting for arbitration 
restricts disputes to the arbitration forum. An institutional arbitration award ensures the arbitrator's decision will be 
enforceable in many public court systems. The accelerated use of international commercial arbitration suggests its 
framework supplies fairness, privacy, predictability, finality, and other transborder business needs.” 
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important that the AARB indoctrinates features that will make it viewed upon as the source of 
arbitral appeal by countries around the world. 
 
A. Finality of the Award: Waiver of Judicial Recourse 
 
One of the main purposes of arbitration is to achieve a final and binding determination of 
a dispute. In order to ensure finality of the award, it is suggested that parties to the arbitration 
governed by the AARB must agree to waive or relinquish the right to judicial or any other form 
of recourse.247 This waiver of the right to judicial recourse will render the award final and 
binding on the parties.  
Article 64(a) of the WIPO rules provides that when parties agree to arbitration under that 
system, they will be deemed to have waived their right to an appeal or recourse to a court or 
other judicial authority.248 However, the parties may waive their right to appeal only “to the 
extent that such a waiver is valid under the applicable law.”249  
The ICSID Convention provides for complete waiver of judicial recourse,  through 
Article 53 which states that “[T]he award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject 
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.” Thus, 
appeals may not be sought in national courts. The Washington Convention binds all member 
states to ensure that their courts recognize and enforce ICSID awards.250
                                                 
247 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 562 
248 Christopher Gibson, Awards and Other Decisions, 9 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb.181 at 199-200, see exception to the rule 
at FN 62: “Note, however, that concerning interim measures of protection or security for claims and costs, Article 
46(d) of the WIPO Rules provides in pertinent part that a request for such relief addressed to a judicial authority 
“shall not be deemed incompatible with the Arbitration Agreement.” 
249 Id at 200: “This form of wording carries with it the implication that the waiver of all forms of appeal is not 
always permissible, and the impact of the law of the place of arbitration must be considered.”   
250 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 552.    
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Thus, when parties are bound by rules of a convention to waive appeals, the award 
rendered is indeed final and binding and the parties cannot seek further review.  In order to give 
finality to the awards rendered by the AARB, the waiver of right to appeal must be indoctrinated 
in the rules relating to its establishment. The AARB must be established by an international 
convention which will bind on all signatory counties and the courts of participating states will 
also be required to recognize and enforce the awards of the appellate body.251  
 
Recourse in Cases of Erroneous Awards 
While all care will be taken to ensure that the awards rendered by any tribunal of the 
AARB are meritorious and devoid of errors, there should still be sufficient recourse available in 
case or erroneous or flawed awards. If an award rendered by the AARB is deemed erroneous or 
flawed (after a thorough determination), the remedial options available include reform of the 
existing award, issuing a new award replacing the erroneous award or reversal of the award.252
 
B. Choice of Law for the AARB 
 
The idea of establishing a permanent body of arbitral appeal comes with the question of 
appropriate choice of law for the arbitration proceedings. Keeping in mind the varied legal 
                                                 
251 See Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 112; see also Schwebel, supra note 6 at 116 – 119; see RUBINO-
SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9 and Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416. 
252 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 563: The scope of remedies available to an arbitral appeals panel is as important 
an aspect of a review system as the review itself. Should such a panel decide that an award is erroneous, there are a 
number of actions that it could take, and the parties should agree at the outset which of these options will be 
available to the appellate panel, to avoid disputes over the appeal tribunal’s authority and to better reflect the parties’ 
preferences with regard to economy and accuracy. If an award is flawed but not fatally so, an appeal tribunal could 
be empowered to reform the award, or to issue a new award replacing the erroneous one. Alternatively, the award 
could be reversed and remanded, either to the original panel or, in some rare circumstances where the original 
arbitrators were unavailable or somehow suspect or disqualified given the issues on appeal, to a new panel, with 
instructions on how errors were to be corrected. This list of components of a potential appeal option is in no way 
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backgrounds of the participants in international commercial arbitration proceedings, the adoption 
of a system of laws that does not conform to one country or region but is instead of a 
transnational253 or a-national254 nature seems a wise choice.  
There is an emerging trend towards the codification and adoption of transnational laws or 
lex mercatoria255 in international trade and commercial disputes.256 The terms “lex mercatoria” 
and “transnational laws” are used synonymously with the terms “transnational commercial law”, 
“principles common to several legal systems” and international trade usages”.257  In the words of 
Emmanuel Gaillard, “[T]he validity of choosing general principles of law - also frequently 
referred to as transnational rules or lex mercatoria- to govern an international contract is widely 
accepted in international commercial arbitration today”.258 The increasing acceptance of 
transnational rules can be witnessed from recent decisions of arbitration institutions259 and 
national courts260. 
                                                                                                                                                             
exclusive and additional research and discussion among practitioners and corporate counsel will be required to draft 
effective clause language and evaluate the practical results of all options. 
253 See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, The Rise of Transnational Legal Practice and The Task of Comparative 
Law, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1215 (2001) and Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 629 (1989); see also 
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10 
254 Id. 
255 Lex Mercatoria has been defined as “A body of principles and regulations applied to commercial transactions and 
deriving from the established customs of merchants and traders rather than the jurisprudence of a particular nation or 
state” by www.answers.com. www.wikipedia.com defines Lex Mercatoria as follows: “The Law Merchant, or Lex 
Mercatoria, was originally a body of rules and principles laid down by merchants themselves to regulate their 
dealings. It consisted of usages and customs common to merchants and traders in Europe, with slightly local 
differences. It originated from the problem that civil law was not responsive enough to the growing demands of 
commerce: there was a need for quick and effective jurisdiction, administered by specialized courts”.  
256 Stephen Jagusch, Recent Codification Efforts: An Assessment, in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique 
Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005) and see generally all other authors in the same book. 
257 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at pages 18-46. 
258 Jagusch, supra note 256 at 65. 
259 Matthias Scherer, The Recognition of Transnational Substantive Rules by Courts in Arbitral Matters, in IAI 
SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NO.3.  TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005) at 95-100 
mentioning the following cases:  See Sept. 1, 1988 Partial award in ICC Case No. 5953, Compania Valenciana de 
Cementos Portland SA (Spain) v. Primary Coal Inc. (US), 1990 Rev. ARB. 701, Oct 26; 1979 Award in ICC Case 
No. 3131, Pabalk Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor, 1983 REV. ARB.525; Final Award in ICC Case No. 3572, 
Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH. v. Government of the State of R’as Al Khaimah (UAE) & the 
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Goldman’s definition of lex mercatoria is particularly relevant to the context of 
international commercial arbitration: “Lex mercatoria would thus, irrespective of its origin and 
the nature of these sources, be the law proper to international economic (commercial) relations. 
One would encompass not only transnational customary law, whether it is codified or not (and in 
the latter case revealed and clarified by arbitral awards) but also law of an interstate, or indeed 
State, which relates to international trade.”261 Goldman’s definition goes on to mention that the 
Hague Conventions of 1964262, the Vienna Convention of 1980263, the Conventions establishing 
Uniform Laws for the International Sale of Goods264 and national laws that specifically dealt 
with international trade would all be part of lex mercatoria.265
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts(hereinafter the 
UNIDROIT Principles)266, the Principles of European Contracts267 and the CENTRAL List of 
Lex Mercatoria Principles, Rules and Standards (hereinafter  CENTRAL List )268 constitute 
efforts at the codification of transnational laws relating to international commercial disputes, 
                                                                                                                                                             
R’as Al Khaimah Oil Co. (Rakoil), XIV Y.B. COM. ARB. 111 (1989); May 5, 1997 Final Award in ICC Case No. 
7365. 
260 Id mentioning the following cases: CA Paris, July 13, 1989, Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland v. 
Primary Coal, 1990 REV. ARB. 663; Cass. Le civ., Oct.22 1991, Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland v. 
Primary Coal Inc., 1992 REV. CRIT. DIP. 113; Austrian Sup. Ct (Oberster Gerichtshof), Nov. 18, 1992, Norsolor v. 
Pabalk, 1983 REV. ARB. 516(1983), 110 J.D.I. 645 (1983); CA Paris, Dec. 15, 1981, Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret 
Sirketi, 1983 REV. ARB. 465; Court of Appeal, Mar. 24, 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft 
mbH. v. R’as Al Khaimah Oil Co. (Rakoil), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.246, [1987] All E.R. 769; House of Lords, June 
23, 1998 [1998] 3 W.L.R. 230, 27 I.L.M. 1032 (1998), 3 (7) INT’L ARB. REP 3 and AI (1998) (The House of 
Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision on other grounds but did not contradict the reasoning relating to the 
application of “internationally accepted principles of law”); United States District Court, Southern District of 
California, Dec7 1998, Ministry of Defence and Support for the Armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
Cubic Defense Systems, 29 F. Supp.2d 1168(S.D. Cal 1998); LEW ET AL., supra note  at 18-50, 18-51; CRAIG ET 
AL, supra note 190 at § 5.05, 5.06. 
261 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47. 
262 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, (1964), (ULIS), Convention Relating 
to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (1964) (ULF). 
263 The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (Vienna Sales Convention, 1980). 
264 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (Apr. 1980) (CISG). 
265 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47. 
266 UNIDROIT (or the International Institute for Unification of Private Law) available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/home.htm. 
267 Available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/textef.html. 
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given that there is an increasing number of commercial relationships that would benefit from the 
application of transnational laws as opposed to a single national law.269 Each of these three 
principles has its own advantages and disadvantages.270 While the Central List represents a more 
contemporary approach to the codification of transnational law, the UNIDROIT principles and 
principles of European Contracts have evolved over time.271 In consideration of which of these 
codes is the “favorite”, it appears that the UNIDROIT principles are preferred over the other 
two.272
Any of these principles may serve the purposes of the AARB or the AARB may create its 
own code of transnational principles. In creating such code, national laws that deal with 
international trade, customary practice, relevant international conventions and the laws of arbitral 
institutions may all be sources of inspiration.273 In creating a code for the appellate institution, 
we should bear in mind that the code should be acceptable to participants from varied national 
backgrounds. 
 
C. Framework of the AARB 
 
The main rationale behind the AARB is to create an institution of appeal whose decisions 
have a binding effect. Since the rules of supranational bodies or conventions have binding effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
268Available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/php/pub_show_toc.php. 
269 Jagusch, supra note 256 at 64-66. 
270 Id at 73-90. 
271 Id at 85. 
272 Jagsuch, supra note 256 at 89. 
273 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47; see also Marc Henry, The Contribution of Arbitral Case law and 
National Laws in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 
2005). 
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on the member states,274 it stands to reason that the AARB will be a supranational body created 
by an international convention. All countries that are signatories to the convention must treat the 
awards rendered by the AARB as final. There will be uniform recognition and enforcement of 
those awards in all the member states, with no interference from national courts.275  
Even with an international convention, it is still possible that the argument of immunity 
may be raised by states (when a state is a party to the proceeding or in some way can establish a 
link to the arbitration) in order to avoid an unfavorable decision,276 as the Benvenuti & Bonfant v. 
Congo277, SOABI (Seutin) v. Senegal278 and the Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (LETCO) v. 
Government of Republic of Liberia279 cases illustrate. It is also important that the states waive 
immunity in relation to the enforcement and execution of awards rendered by the AARB.280 
Hence arbitration agreements drafted by the AARB must include a clause to expressly waive any 
claims to immunity.281 The ICSID suggests a model for waiver of immunity clause which 
stipulates as follows: 
“The [name of contracting state] hereby irrevocably waives any claim to 
immunity in regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award rendered by 
a Tribunal constituted pursuant to this Agreement, including, without limitation, 
immunity from service of process, immunity from jurisdiction of any court, and 
immunity of any of its property from execution.”282
 
                                                 
274 See for example, the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. 
275 See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9; see also Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416, 
Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 112 and Schwebel, supra note 6 at 116 – 119. 
276 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 8-46; see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10. Susan Choi, 
Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under The ICSID And New York Conventions, 28 NYUJILP 175, 181-
184 (1996), mentioning the cases quoted herewith.
277 Judgment of Dec. 23, 1980 (Benvenuti & Bonfant S.A.R.L. v. Government of the People's Republic of Congo), 
Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 108 Journal du Droit International 365 (1981); 1982 Revue de l'Arbitrage 204, reprinted in 1 
ICSID Reports 368 (R. Rayfuse ed., 1993). 
278 État du Sénégal v. Seutin es qualité de liquidateur amiable de la SOABI, Judgment of Dec. 5, 1989, Cour d'appel, 
117 Journal du Droit International 141 (1990); 1990 R. Arb. 164, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1341 (1990); 5 ICSID Rev. 
Foreign Investment L.J. 135 (1990). 
279 650 F. Supp. 73, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987). 
280 See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9. 
281 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 8-46, see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10. 
282 Choi, supra note 276 at 214. 
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The AARB should include a model clause which runs on the lines of the ICSID clause. 
Including such a provision will undoubtedly ensure that the decisions of the AARB are truly 
binding and easily enforceable in all the member countries. 
 
D. Appointment of the Arbitrators 
 
Number of Arbitrators 
Generally, most arbitration tribunals are composed of a three-member panel or a single 
arbitrator.283 If the parties to the arbitration do not agree on the number of arbitrators, the rules of 
a number of institutions provide for the appointment of three arbitrators,284  while others provide 
for a solo arbitrator.285 The main advantage of a three-member panel is that there may be 
improved quality of the award with three arbitrators discussing the case.286 There is also lesser 
possibility that the award rendered is erratic or erroneous.287 With a three-member panel, parties 
will have the services of technical and legal experts to decide the issue. On the other hand, three-
member panels tend to be more expensive than solo arbitrators.288 There is also the possibility 
that the arbitrators may have conflicting schedules that makes it difficult for them to be present 
simultaneously.289 There may also be problems within the tribunal if one of the arbitrators acts in 
                                                 
283 LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 10-10. The authors also mention that, generally, three member panels are preferred 
in civil law countries while solo arbitrators are preferred in common law countries. 
284 Id at 10-18 to 10-20 mentioning UNCITRAL Rules Article 5; China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration. Commission (CIETAC) Rules Article 24; German Institution of Arbitration (hereinafter DIS) Rules 
section 3 (1); Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) Rules Rule 5.  
285 Id at 10-13 mentioning Article 8(2) of the ICC rules which states as follows: “Where the parties have not agreed 
upon the number of arbitrators, the Court shall appoint a sole arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the 
dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of three arbitrators”;  id at 10-15 quoting Article 15 (3) of the English 
Arbitration Act which provides that: “If there is no agreement as to the number of arbitrators, the tribunal shall 
consist of a sole arbitrator”. 
286 See BORN, supra note 211 at 68; LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-18. 
287 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-19. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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a way that is detrimental to the interests of the arbitration.290 Given all these factors, it still 
remains that the proposition of three-member panels to deal with the arbitration proceedings 
seems a viable idea291, with the arbitration proceedings administered by the AARB.292
 
Method of Appointment of Arbitrators 
 Since party autonomy is of primary importance, the selection of the arbitrators is left to 
the choice of the parties.293 The parties to the arbitration proceeding must be given equal 
opportunity to each select an arbitrator of their choice294 and the third member of the panel, who 
will act as the chairman of the panel will be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties or the 
arbitrators.295 In instances where the arbitrators do not agree on the choice of the third 
arbitrator/chairman by a stipulated time limit296, or specifically request (with the consent of the 
parties) that the chairman be appointed, such appointment will then be instituted by the AARB.  
Section 809 of the Italian Rules of Civil Procedure states that:  
“Where the number of arbitrators is not indicated and where the parties do not 
agree thereon, there shall be three arbitrators and, failing their appointment, the 
president of the tribunal shall proceed therewith in the manner specified in Article 
810, unless the parties have provided otherwise.”297
 
Article 38 of the ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules provides that 
 
“If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of 
registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of Art.36, or such other period as the parties may 
agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, and after consulting both 
                                                 
290 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-19. 
291 RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9. 
292 See id. 
293 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-45 
294 Id at 10-81  
295 Id at 10-90. 
296 Id at 10-92 to 10-95mentioning the following: Article 8(4) of the ICC Rules, Article 7(3) of the UNCITRAL 
Rules, CPR Arbitration Rules Rule 5 (2), DIS Rules Section 12 (2) Grain and Free trade Association ( hereinafter 
GAFTA) Rule 3:2 (d). 
297Available at http://www.camera-arbitrale.com/show.jsp?page=169949. 
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parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet 
appointed…”298  
 
Similarly, the AARB will appoint arbitrators under the following circumstances: (1) if the parties 
fail to reach an agreement on the appointment of the arbitrators by a reasonable time limit or (2) 
either party to the proceeding fails to choose an arbitrator or (3) if the selection is left to the 
discretion of the AARB. The reason behind this provision is that the arbitration should not be 
discourage parties from engaging in delaying tactics299 and to bring a speedy resolution to the 
dispute at hand.  
 
E. Code of Ethics for the Arbitrators 
 
The conduct of the arbitrators is of prime importance in conducting a fair and just 
arbitration. Arbitration laws, ethical codes and the rules of various arbitration institutions and 
conventions set forth the requirements regarding confidentiality300, disclosure301 and impartiality 
and independence302 that arbitrators must adhere to. Henry Gabriel and Anjanette H. Raymond 
present a synthesized format,303 drawn from the general rules of major arbitral institutions, the 
specific ethical rules of arbitral institutions as well as the laws that govern arbitration. The ten-
point synthesis provides as follows:  
                                                 
298 Available at http://worldbank.int/icsid/basicdoc/partA-chap04.htm. 
299 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-86.  
300 LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 12-20: For example, LCIA Article 30(2), AAA International Center for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR) Rules Article 34, International Bar Association (IBA) Rules of Ethics Rule 9; see generally 
TIBOR VÁRADY, JOHN J. BARCELÓ & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2003) at 252-261. 
301 LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 11-30: Model Law Article 12, Sweden Arbitration Act Section 9, France NCPC 
Article 1452, UNCITRAL Rules Article 9, ICC Rules Article 7 (2), DIS rules Section 16 and LCIA Article 5 (3). 
302  LEW ET AL supra note at 11-6 to 11-10 mentioning Article 5(2) of the LCIA Rules, Article 22 (a) of the WIPO 
Rules, UNCITRAL Rules Article 9 and IBA Rules of Ethics Rules 1 and 3-1. 
303  Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging 
Standards, 5 WYLR 453 (2005).
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(1) Duty of Competency (2) Duty of Independence and Impartiality (3) Duty to Uphold the 
Integrity and Fairness of the Proceeding (4) Duty of Disclosure (5) Duty to Communicate (6) 
Duty to Act Professionally (7) Duty to Render a Decision (8) Duty to Act in a Fiduciary Manner 
(9) Compensation and (10) Duty of Non-Neutral Arbitrator. This 10-point synthesis may serve as 
a model in drafting the ethical code for the AARB. 
  
F. Qualifications of the Arbitrators 
 
Much has been said about the specialized knowledge and experience that is sought from 
international arbitrators.304  An important criterion in the selection process of an arbitrator is the 
professional background of the arbitrator; for instance, disputes from the textile industry would 
require completely different experience and knowledge than disputes from the software 
industry.305 For this reason, the AARB should maintain an exhaustive list of experts with 
different technical backgrounds.306 Equally important is the selection of legal experts.307 Even 
simple disputes in international commercial arbitration may lead to complex procedures or 
conflict of laws; such problems will require to be handled by a lawyer or arbitrator with thorough 
knowledge about international arbitration law and practice.308 Hence the AARB’s roster should 
contain a combination of eminent technical and legal experts. 
It is also important for the AARB to select arbitrators who possess relevant awareness of 
different cultural and legal backgrounds because such awareness will be helpful in gaining the 
                                                 
304 Infra at Chapter III, page 17-18. 
305 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-38; see VÁRADY ET AL supra note 300 at 278. 
306 See Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 540; see also Newman & Hill supra note 62 and Fiske, supra note 246. 
307 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-38 to 10-40. 
308 Id; Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 540 
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acceptance of parties from different backgrounds.309 Since it is generally advocated that 
international arbitrators possesses command of the language of the arbitration proceedings rather 
than require the services of a translators310, it would be additionally useful if AARB provided the 
services of arbitrators from varied linguistic backgrounds or who possess command of different 
languages. While contemplating the set up of the AARB, it has to kept in mind that there should 
be a comparable number of arbitrators from different countries so as to provide as equal a 
representation as possible. 
 
G. Scope of Review 
 
“[T]he more generous the scope for challenging decisions by appeal or review, 
the greater the chance of eliminating error. But often at a heavy price.”311
 
 
One of the primary considerations in establishing an appellate body of arbitral review is 
to provide for a speedy process of appeals. But a thorough review of merits312 should not to be 
compromised for the ends of an expedited appeals system.313 The AARB is, therefore, faced with 
the daunting task of balancing a thorough system of review with speed and expediency. It is also 
important to take into consideration the needs and expectations of the parties. Existing rules of 
arbitration provide a wide gamut of choices ranging from minimal standards of review314 to 
broad “de novo” standards of review315. 
                                                 
309 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-41. 
310 Id at 10-42.  
311 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 563, quoting Lord Justice Dyson, Finality in Arbitration and Adjudication: The 
Eversheds Lecture 2000, 66 ARBITRATION 288 (2000). 
312  See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9. 
313 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 21-88. 
314 Knull &Rubins, supra note 4 at 560; New York Convention Rules, UNCITRAL Rules 
315 See Grain And Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) Arbitration Rules, Rule 10; Coffee Trade Federation (CTF) 
Arbitration Rules, Rule 40 mentioned by  Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 557: “Generally speaking, commodities 
appeal boards entertain appeals completely de novo, accepting all manner of new evidence and arguments. 
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It is advocated that the choice of a broad or narrow standard of review should a matter of 
decision for the parties to the arbitration. The AARB can offer optional review processes that the 
parties can choose from, based on their preferences and the needs of the dispute at hand.316
 
Provisions to Discourage Frivolous Appeals 
 In order to discourage frivolous or non-meritorious appeals, the AARB can use legal 
ethics or sanctions, in a manner similar to national courts,317 against the appealing party or the 
party’s counsel if the request for review is found to have no legitimate or reasonable basis.318  
This procedure is called “Cost shifting” because in situations where an appellate panel affirms 
the arbitration award, the party instituting a frivolous arbitral appeal would be responsible for his 
opponent’s reasonable legal costs and other reasonable out-of-pocket expenses that have been 
incurred as a result of the appeal.319
The rules of the CPR include two similar provisions.320 The first rule states that in cases 
where the Appeal Tribunal affirms the original award, the appellant is obliged under Rule 12 to 
reimburse the other party for attorneys’ fees and other out-of-pocket expenses related to the 
appeal. The tribunal also has the discretion to allocate costs as it sees fit if the original award is 
modified or set aside. The second rule provides that parties to the appeal procedure must 
undertake under Rule 14 to reimburse opponents for costs associated with any unsuccessful 
                                                                                                                                                             
According to one English commentator, “nowadays, whatever the original arbitration award might say, an appeal 
involves a new hearing, so that the Board is entitled to look at the matter afresh and not pay over much attention to 
the original award.” 
316 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 560. 
317 Marisa Marinelli & Christelette Hoey, As Judicial Tolerance for Appeals Wanes, Litigants Are Risking Sanctions 
When Seeking To Vacate Awards, 25 ALTHCL 51 (2007) and the cases mentioned therein; Sanctions For Frivolous 
Appeal Against An Arbitral Award, 11 WAMREP 296 (2000); see B.L. Harbert International LLC v. Hercules Steel 
Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006), SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1993), Reis v. Morrison, 807 
F.2d 112, 113 (7th Cir. 1986), Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976) 
and Peirotti v. Torian, No. A086713, 2000 WL 696052 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., May 31, 2000). 
318 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 561, see Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop? 61-JAN DRJ 16 (November, 2006-January, 2007) at 24-25. 
319 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 562. 
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subsequent court actions aimed at challenging the original or appellate award.321 The AARB may 
model its provisions along the lines of the above-mentioned examples.  
 
H. Accelerated Appeals Procedure 
 
One of the chief advantages of arbitration as compared to litigation is its time 
effectiveness.322 However, when parties subject an arbitral award to judicial review, it ultimately 
becomes a time-consuming affair. Hence when the AARB is suggested as an alternative to 
judicial review, it is important to include an expedited appeals procedure, which will “appeal” to 
the parties. 
The CPR maintains an appeals procedure with expedited briefing, which is considered to 
be a “useful tool to minimize the time and cost involved in pursuing an appeal”. The CPR 
procedure provide that the initiator of the appeal is to be allowed one opening brief and one 
response, while the appellee can submit only one brief, unless he initiates a cross appeal, and that 
oral arguments may be available at the request of either party. Additional evidence may be 
submitted but the entire appeals process must be completed within six months after the 
composition of the tribunal.323
Sammartano advocates a full hearing on merits and a more detailed appeals procedure for 
an appellate body324, while Knull and Rubins suggest an expedited appeals procedure, along the 
lines of some institutions such as the AAA325, WIPO326 or CAMCA327, to name a few, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
320 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 556 mentioning Rules 12 & 14 of the CPR Arbitration Appeal Procedure. 
321 Id. 
322 See generally infra Chapter III. 
323 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 559-560. 
324 Infra Chapter VI at FN 291. 
325 AAA Expedited Procedures, Art. E-1 to E-10. 
326 WIPO Expedited Rules 1994. 
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provide for “fast-track arbitration” procedures when the parties agree to shorten the time limits 
that would otherwise apply for conducting the arbitration proceeding. They suggest that an 
appeals mechanism may adopt such a similar fast track procedure to decide appeals without 
compromising on accuracy and quality.328 A similar provision may be incorporated in the AARB 
rules to accommodate the needs of parties who desire a quick resolution to their issue. On the 
other hand, if parties so desire and time is not a constraint, a more elaborate appeal mechanism 
may be drafted to accommodate specific needs. The AARB must indoctrinate a flexible 
mechanism that is designed to accommodate varying requisites of parties.329
 
I. Reasonable Costs 
 
One of the main reasons that parties enter into arbitral agreements is to avoid the cost of 
litigating a controversy in a national court.330 Therefore, expensive, drawn-out litigation at the 
award enforcement stage would counter any benefits conferred by the “initial choice of 
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution technique”.331 If, after a successful arbitration, 
such parties still are faced with costly award enforcement litigation in a foreign court, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
327 Commercial Arbitration And Mediation Center Of The Americas (CAMCA) Arbitration Rules 1996. 
328 Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 559:“The desirability of expediency and cost reduction in resolving any dispute 
suggests that the process should, wherever possible consistent with its principal objectives, simplify and accelerate 
the appeals process. If the parties choose to restrict or exclude new evidence at the appeals stage, a significantly 
shortened time frame may be possible relative to the time needed if more evidence is to be permitted. Proposals as to 
how procedures can be accelerated without sacrificing too much accuracy can be gleaned in part from existing fast 
track arbitration rules, published by such organizations as the AAA, WIPO, LCIA, and CAMCA. “Fast track” 
mechanisms could include time limits on initial submissions and subsequent briefs, accelerated tribunal formation or 
standing appeal panels, caps on the length of oral hearings, and short deadlines for the rendering of an award.” 
329 See id at 560. 
330 Curtin, supra note 2 at 357-358; McCartney, supra note 43 at 156,157; Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd., 667 
F.2d 160, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1981):  “Where parties have selected arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, they 
presumably have done so in recognition of the speed and inexpensiveness of the arbitral process; federal courts ill 
serve these aims and that of the facilitation of commercial intercourse by engaging in any more rigorous review than 
is necessary to ensure compliance with [the FAA's] statutory standards.” 
331 Curtin, supra note 2 at 357-358.
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benefits of arbitration would be destroyed.332 The Supreme Court decisions in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Randolph333 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams334 and Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson335 illustrate the reluctance of courts to permit expanded judicial review quoting 
the costs involved to parties as a major reason.336
It is imperative that the AARB incorporates an appeals system that is cost-effective, 
among other things. The costs involved in bringing an appeal should be significantly lesser than 
the comparative costs to bring the same dispute to judicial review, to make it beneficial for the 
parties.  
 
J. Precedent 
 
The AARB may look to prior arbitral awards for guidance and choose to follow the 
decisions set forth earlier. This raises the question of whether arbitral decisions have the value of 
precedent. Often, the publication of arbitral decisions is limited, mostly for reasons of 
                                                 
332 Curtin, supra note 2 at 357-358.
333 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
334 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
335 513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995). 
336 Sullivan, supra note 43 at 530:“In Green Tree Financial Corp., a party attempted to have an arbitration 
agreement silent on the issue of costs invalidated due to the prohibitive expense of the arbitration. The Court 
rejected the party's argument because the party failed to show why the arbitration was expensive and held that such 
an invalidation of an agreement based on costs goes against the federal policy of encouraging arbitration. This 
precedent is important in illustrating that the Court will look to economic factors in interpreting an arbitration 
agreement. Therefore, it might not be outside the realm of reality for the Supreme Court to weigh the economic 
detriment that parties would suffer in submitting awards to heightened judicial review with the advantages of 
contractual freedom”, “The Circuit City case addressed whether employment contracts are beyond the grasp of the 
FAA. After finding that the FAA applied to all employment contracts except those for transportation workers, the 
Supreme Court stated: Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of 
importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning 
commercial contracts. These litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the Courts) would be 
compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often presented in disputes arising from the 
employment relationship. With this pronouncement, it could be difficult for the Court not to take into consideration 
the economic burden on parties and the docket burden on the courts if parties were allowed to expand judicial 
review beyond what is set forth in the FAA”. 
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confidentiality.337 Since arbitral decisions are not published, they are not considered to have the 
value of legal precedent and hence, do not bind on arbitrators.338 Unlike a judge “who feels 
bound by a previous decision, is under the obligation to defer to the precedent even though he 
disagrees with the stated solution”339, an international arbitrator is not bound by prior decisions.  
However, the importance of arbitral case law is not to be undermined. As stated in the 
ICC Award No. 4131340: “The decisions of these tribunals progressively create case-law which 
should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions from economic reality and conforms 
to the needs of international commerce, to which rules specific to international arbitration, 
themselves successively elaborated should respond”.341
The arbitrators of the AARB can be guided by the valuable decisions and reasonings of 
the existing arbitral institutions from around the world without the rigors of being bound by 
those decisions they do not agree with. In the absence of detailed published decisions, excerpts 
of the legal rules applied by the tribunals and other relevant information may be taken into 
consideration.342
There are several international arbitration institutions around the world. For purposes of 
classification, we may divide arbitration institutions into the following categories:343
                                                 
337 See Pierre Duprey, Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents? Should Commercial Arbitration Be Distinguished 
in this Regard from Arbitration Based on Investment Treaties?  in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique 
Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005). 
338 Duprey, supra note 337at 266. 
339 Id. 
340 Isover St. Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al.; ICC Case 4131/1982, I ICC AWARDS 146, 465, 1984 REV. 
ARB. 137, IX YEARBOOK 131 (1984). 
341 Duprey, supra note 337 at 259; see generally CRAIG ET AL., supra note 209 at § 35.02, see also Marc Henry, 
The Contribution of Arbitral Case law and National Laws in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer, 
Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005). 
342 See Article 485 of the ICSID Convention: [t]he Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the 
parties. The Centre may, however, include in its publications excerpts of the legal rules applied by the Tribunal”; see 
also Duprey supra note 337 at 275. 
343 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-25. 
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Institutions Established by Private International Law 
  The ICC International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA), the Arbitration Institution of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce the American 
Arbitration Association, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC), the 
Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC), the  World Intellectual Property 
Organization(WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Centre, the Cairo Regional Center for 
International Commercial Arbitration, the China International Economic Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC),  the American Arbitration Association (AAA), The Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), The Quebec Arbitration Centre, the Korean Commercial Board 
and the Japan Commercial Arbitration association are some of the leading arbitration institutions 
created by private law.344
 
Institutions Established by Public International Law 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the International Center for Settlement of 
investment Disputes (ICSID), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission 
(IACAC), Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization 
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) are some institutions established by public international 
law.345  
 
Industry-specific /Commodity Institutions 
Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), Coffee Trade Federation (CTF), London 
Rice Brokers' Association (LRBA), Refined Sugar Association (RSA), Federation of Oils. Seeds 
                                                 
344 LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-26 to 3-34.  
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and Fats Association (FOSFA), the Japan Shipping Exchange, the Hamburg Freundliche 
Arbitrage and the Bremen Cotton Exchange in Germany (Baumwollborse) are some arbitration 
institutions that are industry-specific.346
 
Special Purpose Institutions 
The Iran – US Claims Tribunal, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
the Claims Resolution for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (CRT) and the International 
Commission on Holocaust Rea Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) are some special-purpose tribunals 
established to handle claims arising out of revolutions, war or other events that affect a large 
number of people in the same way.347
The list of arbitration institutions provided here is not comprehensive.348 As is evident 
from the list above, there are a plethora of arbitration institutions that have dealt with a vast 
number of cases. There are also decisions of ad hoc arbitrations. The AARB may look to any or 
all relevant arbitral decisions for guidance.  
It is said that in order for arbitral case law to be implemented, it is imperative to have a 
“distinctly organized structure that, by the specificity of its functioning, ensures coherence in the 
establishment of arbitration case law”.349 The establishment of the AARB will provide precisely 
such a structure for the appellate review of arbitral awards. To date, the decisions of arbitrators 
are not part of any national order, so “the awards do not have a natural tendency to constitute 
                                                                                                                                                             
345 LEW ET AL., supra note1 at 3-36 to 3-38. 
346 Id at 3-35 to 3-36.   
347 Id at 3-39 to 3-58. 
348 For a more comprehensive list, see http://www.arbitration-icca.org/directory_of_arbitration_website.htm.    
349 Duprey supra note 337 at 271. 
  
65 
established case law”350. The establishment of the AARB will, undoubtedly, contribute to the 
establishment of arbitral case law. 
 
K. Conclusion 
 
The AARB will be modeled on the principles detailed above. While the above-mentioned 
principles are illustrative, they are certainly not exhaustive. They may serve as starting points for 
the consideration of the establishment of the AARB. As more scholars, arbitrators and others 
contemplate the idea, more useful suggestions and ideas will undoubtedly arise which will pave 
the way for the AARB to become a practical reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
350 Duprey supra note 337 at 257, 258. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and 
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.”351
 
The idea of establishing a permanent body for arbitration has been advocated time and 
again by scholars and experts.352 Several commentators have alluded to the benefits of a single 
transnational source of appeal for arbitral awards.353 However, it is disheartening to note that no 
significant progress has been made towards the achievement of this objective. Admittedly, there 
are several practical hurdles in achieving such an objective354 and it is a task of no easy 
magnitude, but the benefits outweigh the hardships.  
As illustrated in the previous chapters, the establishment of the AARB will be a solution 
to several problems rampant in international commercial arbitration and bring about a much-
needed uniform system of review of arbitral awards. The contemplated idea probably involves 
several years of consolidated effort and international cooperation. This is all the more reason 
why immediate efforts should be taken towards the achievement of this task. 
                                                 
351 RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.12, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ comment in Hyde v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 347,391(1912). 
352 Infra Chapter I.   
353 Id ; see Sarles, supra note 67 at 4 ; see also BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8 at  60; Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, 
The Fall of a Taboo: Review of the Merits of an Award by an Appellate Arbitration Panel and a Proposal for an 
International Appellate Court Journal of International Arbitration 20(4): 387–392, 2003. 
354 See Martin Hunter, “The Impossible Dream” in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds., 
1995) at 157. 
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While critics may view this as an “impossible and infeasible” proposition,355 it is wise to 
bring to their attention the words of Judge Holtzmann:  
“Let us pause for a minute to consider whether many of the developments in 
international arbitration that seem ordinary today would have been thought to be 
impossible dreams 100 years ago when the predecessor of the London Court of 
International arbitration first opened its doors to serve the business community. If, 
for example, someone had predicted in 1893 at a celebration of the inauguration 
of the London Chamber of Arbitration that within the coming century 90 nations 
would enter into a multilateral treaty binding themselves to procedures requiring 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards such as appear in the 
New York Convention, would that not have been viewed as an impossible dream? 
Yet, today, we recognise that the New York Convention is an indispensable 
element in the structure of commercial arbitration.”356
 
The establishment of an AARB can well be achieved given significant international effort and 
cooperation. The arrival of the AARB will signify the true “internationalization”357 of 
international commercial arbitration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
355 See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO supra note 6 at 35.9.  
356 Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 109-110. 
357 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY 
CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds., 1995) 
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